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“Render therefore unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s, and unto God
the things that are God’s.”2
I. INTRODUCTION
For well over two thousand years, Western civilization has made a judgment that
the mentally ill suffer not only from an illness, but also from a social condition.3 Nor
has it been alone in this judgment; indeed, this view is almost uniform throughout the
world.4 The result of this judgment is that the mentally ill have for a long time been
held not responsible for their actions, be they of a civil or criminal nature.5 Certain
problems accompany such a decision. Society needs to distinguish the severely
mentally ill, from those who may be ill but not severely. A decision needs to be
made about what to do with the mentally ill, in lieu of legal liability. Society has
grappled with these questions for generations, with each generation purportedly
giving a more progressive and humane answer.
As the science of medicine in general and of psychiatry6 in particular has
developed, the criminal justice system has attempted to harvest the increased
scientific knowledge so that it could help in answering these questions (although it
has remained somewhat ambivalent about psychiatric involvement).7 Psychiatrists
are now closely involved in multiple stages of criminal justice administration.8 Such
involvement has quite often been lauded as it is perceived to be scientific, and thus
objective, ridding the criminal justice system of arbitrariness and uncertainty in its

2

Matthew 22:21 (American Standard).

3

See generally, JUDITH NEAMAN, SUGGESTIONS OF THE DEVIL: INSANITY
AGES AND THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (Anchor ed. 1975).

IN THE

MIDDLE

4
For example, Chinese law also allowed the mentally ill to escape punishment for their
criminal acts. See, e.g., Robin Munro, Judicial Psychiatry in China and its Abuses, 14
COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 15-18 (2000).
5

See NEAMAN, supra note 2, at 67-68.

6

Throughout this article, for the sake of brevity and consistency the term “psychiatry” or
“psychiatrist” is used; however, it is meant to encompass all mental health professionals.
7
See Michael L. Perlin, Unpacking the Myths: The Symbolism Mythology of Insanity
Defense Jurisprudence, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 599, 674 (1989/1990) (“This tragic
ambivalence is reflected in judicial desires to have mental health experts testify as to future
dangerousness, an expertise which psychiatrists themselves freely acknowledge they do not
have, and to have them “take the weight” on difficult decisions involving commitment or
release, especially in the cases of individuals hospitalized following insanity acquittals”).
8
For a general discussion on the rules and stages of psychiatric involvement in criminal
justice system see WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW (3rd ed.) 363-391 (2000); see also
ABRAHAM S. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE (1967).
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involvement with the criminally insane.9 Today psychiatrists are involved in every
stage of the criminal process, from the preliminary hearing to long after conviction
or acquittal by reason of insanity.10 Because of their undisputed expertise in mental
health, some of the judgments that psychiatrists make go unquestioned by the
criminal justice system.11 When such judgments are questioned however, a “battle of
the experts” ensues12 where the scientific truth gets lost.13 Psychiatrists are often
asked to testify on issues that they have no particular expertise in. A psychiatrist
cannot intelligently answer whether the accused poses future danger, yet such
questions are routinely asked. A psychiatrist also has no specialized knowledge to
answer such questions of morality as “did the person know ‘right from wrong’ or
‘good from evil.’” However, the courts do tend to allow psychiatrists to offer
testimony on such essentially moral questions. Thus, psychiatrists are tempted to
justify the judgments of the courts or alternatively to substitute their own morality
for that of the rest of the society (as expressed by the jury). Such intertwining of
medicine and the law does not do justice, and reflects poorly on the medical
profession. The “battle of the experts” and the resultant and concomitant distrust
that lay juries often end up having in experts14 are but a symptom of this problem.
This article argues that despite the benefits of ridding the criminal justice system of
some uncertainty and ignorance with respect to mental health issues, the very close
involvement of psychiatrists in the criminal justice system as practiced in the United
States is not only illogical and bad policy, but also unethical from the viewpoint of
medical ethics.
Part II of this article will lay the groundwork for the argument by discussing the
history of the insanity defense, and of science’s involvement with criminal justice;
while Part III, will look into the association of science and the administration of
justice in the modern world. Part IV will argue that the alternative methods of
linking psychiatry and the criminal justice system, such as independent expert
panels, do not solve the fundamental problem of psychiatrists working beyond their
ethical boundaries. Finally, Part V will focus on the ethical principles that should
guide a psychiatrist in his involvement with the judiciary.

9
See, e.g., CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY AND PSYCHIATRIC TESTIMONY, COMMITTEE ON
PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW, GROUP FOR ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY (May 1954) in BY
REASON OF INSANITY (Lawrence Z. Freedman ed. 1983) 12 (stating that psychiatric testimony
is “in the interest of a comprehensive criminal justice.”)
10

See generally LAFAVE, supra note 8; GOLDSTEIN, supra note 8.

11

See generally LAFAVE, supra note 8, at 368.

12

See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 8, at 134.

13

Henry Weihofen, Eliminating the Battle of the Experts in Criminal Insanity Cases, 48
MICH. L. REV. 961, 962 (1950). (Hereinafter Battle of the Experts).
14

See id. at 967. (Suggesting that juries tend to disbelieve “experts” if they also have an
access to “independent” opinion.)
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II. INSANITY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. Why Absolve the “Lunatics?”
The mentally ill and feeble minded have for a long time been treated differently
in the law.15 This legal distinction can be traced as far back as the Roman Empire
Law.16 This exception from criminal responsibility survived through the ages to the
present day. This section of the article will attempt to articulate a variety of policy
and ethical reasons as to why the mentally ill have enjoyed and continue to enjoy an
exemption from criminal responsibility.
Any reason to exclude a group of people from punishment for certain acts must
rest in the reasons and theory underlying punishment itself.17 Thus, when one looks
at various reasons for punishment advanced throughout the ages, one will have a
better understanding of why the mentally ill were often not subject to the full range
thereof.
Several classic theories for punishment have been advanced throughout the years.
None of these theories however can be applied to the insane. As no theory of
punishment fits them, it must follow that punishment is not to apply to the mad.
One theory for why society punishes wayward individuals is to prevent these
same individuals from inflicting further harm upon the society.18 This is best
understood as specific deterrence. In essence this theory is very Pavlovian19 in its
nature. By subjecting a violator to negative experiences, the society hopes to elicit
an understanding that further rule-breaking will lead to more negative experiences,
while following the rules will result in positive experiences.20 However, this
mechanism cannot succeed merely on the “stimulus-response” axis. Some
understanding of events surrounding the punishment and of the punishment itself
must occur in order for this theory to be effective.21
Another theory of punishment is rehabilitation of the wayward members of
society.22 The offenders are incarcerated not just to make them safe,23 but also more
productive members of society.24 Of course, penance requires that one understands

15

See generally Perlin, supra note 7; see also NEAMAN, supra note 2.

16

See NEAMAN, supra note 3, at 69.

17

The major underlying reason for administering punishment on an individual basis is a
belief in personal responsibility. See Francis B. Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV.L.REV. 974
(1932).
18

See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 8, at 12-13.

19

A famous experiment by a Russian physiologist Ivan Pavlov showed that a dog can be
conditioned to exhibit a physiological response based on an unrelated stimulus that is paired
with a stimulus that naturally causes the said physiological response.
20

See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 8, at 12.

21

Id. at 12-13.

22

LAFAVE, supra note 8, at 326.

23

MICHAEL MOORE, LAW & PSYCHIATRY: RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP 234 (1984).

24

Id.
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that his actions are wrong, and more importantly, that he has the ability to act
“right.”25
Oftentimes, the desire to educate society on the principles of right and wrong
drives the criminal justice system.26 Two theories are at work. One is that the very
process of apprehending, prosecuting and punishing the culprit serves to educate the
rest of society as to the prohibited type of conduct, especially as the laws and
regulations proliferate at such rate that few individuals can keep pace.27 The other is
that punishment (by being an unpleasant experience) deters other members of society
from engaging in unpalatable conduct.28 By punishing individuals, society
affirmatively tells everyone that certain behavior is wrong, and showcases what
awaits those who do not heed societal prohibitions.29
The oldest theory of punishment is the one of “just deserts.”30 It is aimed directly
at the culprit and is based on the idea that the suffering inherent in any punishment is
deserved.31 Through punishment, society exacts its vengeance on those who choose
to disregard its rules.32 The pain that the punishment inflicts on the criminal is in
return for the pain that the criminal inflicts on society through his own freely chosen
wrongful actions.33
Finally, punishment is also inflicted to incapacitate the offender, i.e., to place him
in such a surrounding where he can commit no more crimes.34 (This of course
discounts the possibility of crime “on the inside,” but even with this factor accounted
for, it is undeniable that a person against whom strict control is exercised is not able
to cause as much damage as he would otherwise be able to do.)35 Prison
incapacitates dangerous criminals and the society therefore justifiably feels safer.36

25

This follows from the underlying premise of the theory that when causes of bad behavior
are removed, the delinquent will act right. LAFAVE, supra note 8, at 24. Incarceration,
irrespective of the amount of training for the new life that it provides, simply cannot cure a
medical condition, so the insane even with the new skills the insane will not be able to act
“right.” Cf. Helen H. Stern, Madness in the Criminal Law, 40 TEMPLE L.Q. 348, 360 (1967).
26

FRANKLIN ZIMRING, PERSPECTIVES ON DETERRENCE 4 (1971).

27

HEINRICH OPPENHEIMER, THE RATIONALE OF PUNISHMENT 293-94 (1913).

28

ZIMRING, supra note 26, at 3.

29

Id.

30

Sometimes it is referred to as retribution or revenge or retaliation. LAFAVE, supra note
7, at 26.
31

IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 195 (W. Hastie tr. 1887)

32

See JAMES F. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 81 (1883).

33

See MICHAEL S. MOORE, THE MORAL WORTH OF RETRIBUTION
CHARACTER AND EMOTIONS (F. Shoeman, ed.) 179 (1987).

IN

RESPONSIBILITY

34

LAFAVE, supra note 8, at 24.

35

Ledger Wood, Responsibility and Punishment, 28 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 630, 639
(1939).
36

John J. Diulio, Jr., Prisons are a Bargain, By Any Measure, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1996 at

A17.
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The mentally ill are not subject to the punishments meted out by the criminal
justice system for a variety of reasons. Some, such as “specific deterrence”37 and
“rehabilitation,”38 have to do with the fact that mentally ill cannot understand the
nature of punishment anymore than they can understand the nature of the crime,39
and the significance of punishment is therefore lost on them.40 Some, such as
“education”41 or “deterrence”42 theories have to do with the benefits that inure to the
public from such exculpation; because by exculpating the mentally ill, the “right”
and “wrong” are brought into focus more clearly.43 Yet other rationales come from
policy reasons that caution against equating a lunatic with a sinister criminal,
accordingly making “retribution” inappropriate.44 Although restraint may seem
applicable to both sane and insane,45 the incapacitation of the insane cannot be
viewed as punishment, for they are not merely incapacitated, but treated.46
Underlying it all, however, is a moral judgment that the mentally ill are not
sufficiently “bad” to warrant the condemnation inherent in conviction and criminal
sanction.47 Since “insanity” (and thus lack of responsibility) is a moral view on the
part of society, the actions of those involved in the process of separating out the
“bad” from the “insane” should conform to that underlying judgment.
B. Science and the Law
Psychiatry was involved in criminal justice at least as far back as the Middle
Ages.48 The two professions that dealt with mental illness at that time (i.e., clergy
and physicians) came into contact with the criminal justice system because the law of
the times allowed both “idiots”49 and “lunatics”50 to be exempted from punishment.51
37
The insane cannot be deterred by punishment because as a result of mental illness they
do not respond as expected to societal stimuli. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 8, at 13.
38

See supra note 33 and the accompanying text.

39

GOLDSTEIN, supra note 8, at 13.

40

Id.

41

Punishing people who are not viewed to be “blameworthy” does not educate anyone on
anything, instead it blurs distinctions between culpable, and non-culpable conduct. LAFAVE,
supra note 8, at 326.
42
One is not deterred if he cannot identify with the situation of the criminal. As most
individuals cannot identify with the mentally ill, the punishment does not deter. GOLDSTEIN,
supra note 8, at 13.
43

See supra note 40.

44

GOLDSTEIN, supra note 8, at 12.

45

LAFAVE, supra note 8, at 326.

46

Id. at 382.

47
See The Insanity Defense: ABA and APA Proposals for Change, 7 MENTAL DISABILITY
REP. 136, 141 (1983).
48

See generally NEAMAN, supra note 2.

49

Idiocy was considered to be an inborn and hereditary condition, akin to what today
would be called mental retardation. Idiots could never achieve normalcy, and therefore never
had either rights or responsibilities commensurate with that of the rest of the citizenry. See

2002-03]

A HEALER OR AN EXECUTIONER?

175

Thus a differentiation between those who were sufficiently ill to qualify and those
who were not was necessary.52 The definition of an “idiot” was
[A] person who cannot account or number twenty pence, nor can tell who
was his father or mother, nor how old he is, etc., so as it may appear he
hath no understanding of reason what shall be for his profit, or what for
his loss. But if he have such understanding that he know and understand
his letters, and do read by teaching of another man, then it seems he is not
a sot or natural fool.53
Lunatics on the other hand were defined as persons who suffered from an
imbalance of humours.54 Idiots were completely free from criminal responsibility
throughout their lives as they were seen as ever unable to reason and thus form
intent.55 Lunatics on the other hand were free from the responsibility only during the
period of raving lunacy, and had to carry all the legal burdens during the periods of
clarity.56 An assessment thus needed to be made whether the person was currently
suffering from a disorder or was in his lucid interval.57 Medical professionals were
used to evaluate those whose sanity or other mental faculties were in question,58 yet
the credence they were given did not arise out of the respect for their training or
degrees, but rather because the juries believed that they were in a position to closely
observe the defendant and thus best able to describe his condition.59 Thus, although
medical opinion could be offered, it rarely was, and when it was, although
considered useful, it was not given greater weight than layperson’s testimony. This
changed greatly with the arrival of the 19th century.

JOHN BRYDALL, NON COMPOS MENTIS, OR THE LAW RELATING TO NATURAL FOOLS, MADFOLK,
AND LUNATICK PERSONS, INQUISITED, AND EXPLAINED FOR COMMON BENEFIT 6 (1700).
50
Lunacy, unlike idiocy, was not considered to be either inborn or hereditary. A lunatic
could have moments of “clarity” whereupon all rights and responsibilities of a citizen would
devolve upon him (until the relapse). See id. at 94; see also HENRICI DI BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS
ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE [ON LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND] 321 (Travers Twiss, ed.
& trans., William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 1990) (1250).
51

See NEAMAN, supra note 2. (The law cared not about the diagnosis, but whether the
defendant could behave in accordance with the law).
52

See id.

53

ANTHONY FITZHERBERT, NATURA BREVUM 579 (1534).

54

See NEAMAN, supra note 2.

55

See BRYDALL, supra note 49, at 12.

56

Id. at 110.

57

NEAMAN, supra note 2, at 77.

58

Id. at 68-69.

59

See Fran R. Freemon, The Origin of Medical Expert Witness, 22 J. LEGAL MED. 349
(2001).

176

JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH

[Vol. 17:169

Perhaps the most well documented case (prior to modern times) of expert
medical testimony in support of mental illness occurred in 180060 at the trial of
James Hadfield.61 Mr. Hadfield was accused of attempting to assassinate the King of
England,62 a charge of high treason, punishable by death.63 Hadfield previously
served as a dragoon in an Anglo-French war,64 where he sustained severe injuries to
the head,65 to the point that the membrane of his brain was visible.66 His most able
counselor, Hon. Thomas Erskine,67 made the most of the insanity defense.68 In
addition to several lay witnesses who testified as to Hadfield’s erratic behavior,69
Erskine called three different physicians to the stand.70 Mr. Henry Cline, an eminent
surgeon, testified that wounds sustained to the head during the war were sufficient to
cause brain damage.71 Next, Doctor Creighton testified that the Hadfield suffered
from delusions;72 that “he was ordained to die as Jesus Christ.”73 Finally, Mr.
Lidderdale,74 another surgeon, testified that the insanity served as a cause of the
discharge from the army.75

60
Although there were insanity defenses and acquittals before that time, this trial is one of
the few that occurred quite a long time ago, and yet is very well documented. Furthermore,
even though there were such pleas and acquittals, up until 1740 they were quite few in
number, and perhaps this contributed to lack of documentation. See Richard Moran, The
Origin of Insanity as a Special Verdict: The Trial for Treason of James Hadfield (1800), 19
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 487, 488 (1985). Furthermore, it must be noted that juries relied mostly on
their personal understanding of sanity and insanity, and although medical experts testified
their testimony was given no more or less credence than testimony of any other person.
Freemon, supra note 58, at 349.
61
Trial of James Hadfield For High Treason, 27 Howell’s English State Trials 1281 (K.B.
1800).
62

Id. at 1283.

63

Moran, supra note 60, at 496-497.

64

27 How. St. Tr. at 1330.

65

Id.

66

Moran, supra note 60, at 504.

67

27 How. St. Tr. at 1281.

68

See Moran, supra note 59, at 502-08.

69

See 27 How. St. Tr. 1330-56.

70

See id. at 1332-36.

71

Id. at 1332-33.

72

Id. at 1334.

73

Id. at 1335.

74

Mr. Lidderdale was an army surgeon with the 15th Light Dragoon Regiment, the same
one that Hadfield served in. 27 How. St. Tr. at 1135.
75

Id. at 1335-36.
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At the time of James Hadfield’s trial though, juries were thought to put little
stock in the medical testimony76 and instead relied on the testimony of lay people,
such as friends or acquaintances.77 The trial helped to start a process of changing
these attitudes. The testimony of a psychiatrist is now considered to be most
useful,78 although general physicians (especially if they have been treating the
defendant for some period of time) also offer testimony.79 It has been noted that
juries tend to believe “independent” (i.e., court-appointed) experts more than an
expert for any particular side.80
Although medical professionals are generally held in higher esteem then before,81
some juries have disregarded medical testimony to find defendants sane on the basis
of lay testimony when such testimony contradicted that of a psychiatrist.82 Courts
have upheld such verdicts.83 It is the contention of this article that the juries
disregard professional testimony84 because such testimony has fallen into disrepute
due to the very nature of “battling experts.”85 When psychiatrists are allowed to
testify on issues beyond their competence (e.g., morals, dangerousness) their
testimony ceases to be legitimate expert testimony. The contention is that if
psychiatry is to keep its legitimate place within the criminal justice system, it must
be nothing more than an objective evaluator of medical information, and leave the
determination of moral culpability to non-physicians. Both policy and medical
ethics call for such a result.
C. Various Judicial Tests for Insanity.
Mental illness, however defined, has for a very long time been viewed as an
exculpatory answer to a charge of crime.86 Almost eight hundred years ago Lord
Bracton announced the principle that people who do not know what they are doing,
76

See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.

77

Moran, supra note 60, at 506.

78

LAFAVE, supra note 8, at 378.

79

See, e.g., State v. Armant, 719 So.2d 510 (La. App. 1998); Holt v. State, 181 P.2d 573
(Okl. App. 1947). But see State v. Doiron 90 So. 920 (La. 1922) (holding that a physician,
who had no knowledge or experience with mental diseases or insane persons, was not
competent to testify as an expert on insanity).
80

See Weihofen, Battle of the Experts, supra note 13, at 966-67.

81

See supra notes 58-59 and 75 and accompanying text.

82

Scott E. Sundby, The Jury As Critic: Empirical Look at How Juries Perceive Expert and
Lay Testimony, 83 VA. L. REV. 1109 (1997).
83

E.g., State v. Evans, 523 A.2d 1306 (Conn. 1987); Montano v. State, 468 N.E.2d 1042
(Ind. 1984); Ice v. Commonwealth, 667 S.W.2d 671 (Ky. 1984); Commonwealth v. Tyson,
402 A.2d 995 (Pa. 1979).
84

See supra, note 82 and accompanying text.

85

Jurors tend to view conflicting experts as essentially canceling each other out, thus
negating the very benefits that experts are supposed to provide. See Sundby, supra note 82, at
1138-39.
86

See supra, notes 4 and 14-15 and accompanying text.
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cannot be held responsible for their actions.87 The premise of the “ability to discern
between good and evil”88 test for criminal responsibility rested on a notion that
children under the age of seven, (i.e., under the “age of reason”) cannot be held
responsible for their actions.89 So too, the courts of the time reasoned, if a man is
like a child who cannot tell a difference, he too cannot be held responsible for his
actions.90 The test for what constitutes sufficient affliction to be held not criminally
responsible has changed, but the basic proposition that at least some of the mentally
ill should not be dealt with within the bounds of the criminal justice system has
remained largely unchanged.91
Since Lord Bracton’s original pronouncement on what will suffice to have a
person adjudged not responsible for his action, the common law tried several
different approaches to identify those that are sufficiently ill to escape criminal
punishment.92 For example, in Rex v. Arnold,93 Justice Tracy instructed the jury to
acquit the defendant if they found that he was “a man that is totally deprived of his
understanding and memory, and doth not know what he is doing, no more than an
infant, or a wild beast, or a brute, [for] such a one is never the object of
punishment.”94 One can conclude from such a definition that the underlying idea
under the Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity acquittal was total deprivation of
senses.95 While medical professionals could be used in such a circumstance, such
complete “lunacy” should have been evident even without medical testimony. As
described above, this “complete madness”96 notion was successfully challenged by
Thomas Erskine in the trial of James Hadfield,97 and so the involvement of medical
professionals became more pronounced.98

87

BRACTON, supra note 50, at 321.

88

See Perlin, supra note 7, at n. 140.

89

Id.

90

See NIGEL WALKER, CRIME AND INSANITY IN ENGLAND 28-29 (1973).

91

See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding the execution of mentally
retarded unconstitutional); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (holding unconstitutional
the execution of the insane); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3596(c) (exempting the mentally retarded
from death penalty); Ga. Code Ann. § 17-7-131(j) (same); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 400.27
(same).
92

See Perlin¸ supra note 7, at 631-40.

93

16 How. St. Tr. 695 (1724).

94

Id.

95

Raymond L. Spring, Farewell to Insanity: A Return to Mens Rea, 66-MAY J. KAN. B.
ASS’N. 38, 39 (1997).
96

The “right and wrong” or “wild beast” tests were in essence “all-or-none.” If a person
could exhibit some reason no matter how small, he would generally be considered competent.
See Brydall, supra note 49, at 8 (stating that if a person can name the days of the week or
count to twenty, or know his age or know who his parents are, he is not an “idiot.”).
97

See supra notes 60-75 and accompanying text.

98

See supra note 60.
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A new test was announced after deliberation in the House of Lords, subsequent to
an acquittal of Daniel M’Naghten of the charge of treason.99 The M’Naghten test
also specifically made “disease or defect of mind” a prerequisite to an insanity
acquittal, rather than just a general “wild beast” state.100 Additionally, their lordships
stated that in order to be acquitted, one “labouring under such a defect of reason,
from disease of the mind, [did] not … know the nature and quality of the act he was
doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know what he was doing was wrong.”101
Thus, mental illness was necessary, but insufficient for the acquittal. In so deciding
a case, the House of Lords virtually assured that science and medicine would stay
involved with the law.
The M’Naghten test survived for a very long time102 and in many jurisdictions is
still in use today.103 The major (albeit brief) departure and expansion of the
availability of the insanity defense came in 1954, when the D.C. Circuit handed
down its decision in Durham v. United States.104 The Durham court held it to be
irrelevant whether defendant knew right from wrong,105 and instead relied on a
“product test.”106 The court stated that the accused is not to be held criminally liable
if his criminal act was a “product of mental disease or defect.”107 Durham was the
high point of involving science in the criminal adjudication, in the sense that it called
for the jury to hear all pertinent medical testimony on mental disease.108 However,
the court did not subscribe to the notion that the presence of mental disease or
psychiatric testimony would serve as a final determination of sanity.109 Indeed, one
of the reasons the D.C. Circuit adopted the new rule was to separate scientific
determinations from the legal ones.110 The court stated that the “[j]uries will
continue to make moral judgments, still operating under the fundamental precept that
‘Our collective conscience does not allow punishment where it cannot impose
blame,’”111 while not focusing exclusively on “whether he displayed particular
99

M’Naghten’s Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).

100

Id at 722.

101

Id.

102

Indeed the first wholesale revision occurred in 1954 when a new legal test for insanity
was proposed. See infra notes 103-06 and accompanying text. It must be said though that in
1929 in Smith v. United States, 36 F.2d 548 (1929), the D.C. Circuit added “irresistible
impulse” as an additional excuse.
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See infra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
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214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954), overruled by U. S. v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 981
(D.C.Cir. 1972).
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214 F.2d at 872.
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Id. at 874-75.
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Id.
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See id. at 875.
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See id.
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Id. at 876.

111

Id.
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symptoms which medical science has long recognized do not necessarily, or even
typically, accompany even the most serious mental disorder.”112
Durham was abandoned in 1972.113 Today many states continue to follow the
M’Naghten test or the American Legal Institute (ALI) test.114 (There was a trend
away from the ALI test back to M’Naghten following the NGRI acquittal of John
Hinckley.)115 The ALI test is centered on whether or not the defendant lacked
“substantial capacity” to “appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or
to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.”116 The ALI test, although at
first glance is quite similar to the M’Naghten rule, answers one of the main criticisms
of M’Naghten,117 insofar as it does not rely as heavily on actually “knowing right
from wrong,”118 instead focusing on the “capacity”119 to make that distinction. The
main criticism of this test has been that the words “substantial capacity” are not
defined, thus potentially causing confusion in the experts and the juries.120
Differences among experts that result from the lack of precision of the ALI rule are
likely to lead to the “battle” of these experts, perhaps confusing the jury even
further.121
Throughout time, many different definitions of criminal insanity have been
tried,122 yet a perfect one has yet to be found. Some, like the ALI test, are deemed to
be too imprecise,123 some like M’Naghten, too rigid.124 Yet, irrespective of what test
a modern jurisdiction uses, they rely on the help of psychiatrists in verifying that for

112

214 F.2d at 876.

113

U. S. v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 981 (D.C.Cir. 1972).

114

For example, the United States follow M’Naghten rule, 18 U.S.C. § 20, while many
states have adopted the ALI Model Penal Code definitions either by statute or court decision.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sheehan, 383 N.E.2d 1115 (Mass. 1978); State v. Johnson, 399
A.2d 469 (R.I. 1979); Graham v. State, 547 S.W.2d 531 (Tenn. 1977); State v. Grimm 195
S.E.2d 637 (W.Va. 1973). See also, John Ogloff, A Comparison of Insanity Defense
Standards on Juror Decision Making, 15 L. & HUMAN BEH. 509, 510 (1991).
115

See Valerie P. Hans & Dan Slater, John W. Hinckley, Jr. & the Insanity Defense: The
Public Verdict, 47 PUB. OPINION Q. 202 (1983).
116

MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01.

117

The Model Penal Code stated that the whether defendant had “knowledge” of right and
wrong cannot be answered by science, and is better left to the province of theologians and
philosophers. Id., § 4.01, Appendix A (1985).
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M’Naghten’s Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843).

119

MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1).
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See, e.g., Richard H. Kuh, The Insanity Defense-An Effort to Combine Law and Reason,
110 U. PA. L. REV. 771, 797-99 (1962).
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Cf. id. at 799.
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See supra notes 87-121 and the accompanying text.
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Of course some jurisdictions also deem it to be too lenient. See supra note 114-15 and
accompanying text.
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See, e.g., Durham, 214 F.2d at 870-71.
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the criminal justice purposes, the person in question is insane.125 To what degree
such help should be used is the focus of this article.
III. PSYCHIATRY AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN THE MODERN WORLD
A. Psychiatric Involvement Today
The role of psychiatrist in today’s criminal justice system is varied and multidimensional.126 Psychiatrists can get involved in any stage of the process, from the
initial hearing determining competency to stand trial,127 to testifying at trial as to the
mental state of the accused,128 to post-sentencing129 (or post-acquittal)130 treatment.
The testimony of the psychiatrist can be based not only upon personal evaluation of
the defendant,131 but also on such questionable techniques as evaluation of the other
testimony in the case132 or even a hypothetical question propounded by counsel.133
Needless to say, the testimony offered at these proceedings may not always be
grounded in hard science.134 Additionally, at several stages of the process, the
defendant may be entitled to his own (as opposed to the one working for the state)
psychiatric expert witness.135 As can be expected, when one psychiatrist works for
one side and another for a different side, the conclusions as to culpability do not
125

See supra note 78 and accompanying text.

126

See generally, M. Gregg Bloche, Psychiatry, Capital Punishment, and the Purposes of
Medicine, 16 Int’l. J. L. & Psychiatry 301, 311-16 (1993) (hereinafter Psychiatry and Capital
Punishment).
127

Id. at 311.

128

Id. at 312.

129

See id. at 314.

130

LAFAVE, supra note 8, at 382.

131

Weihofen, Battle of the Experts, supra note 13, at 277-78.

132

Id. at 279-80.

133
Id. at 280-83. This technique, largely due to its inherent flaws, however is not
frequently used. LAFAVE, supra note 8, at 378.
134

See WILLIAM A. WHITE, INSANITY AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 86 (1923); Weihofen, Battle
of the Experts, supra note 13, at 283; L. Vernon Briggs, Medico-Legal Insanity and the
Hypothetical Question 14 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 62 (1923).
135

Some states have statutes requiring the state to pay for the psychiatric defense of the
indigents. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 79 n. 4 (1985). In Ake, the Court recognized
that psychiatric evaluation may be necessary for the defense to properly present its case and
required states to provide a psychiatrist for that purpose. Although the Court did not explicitly
say that the psychiatrist must work exclusively for the defense (i.e., implying that prosecution
and defense can “share”), the Court did recognize that psychiatrists disagree widely and
frequently” on the issue of legal insanity. This may imply that “sharing” will not work, as
defense and prosecution will each seek out psychiatrists with differing points of view. Id. at
80-81. Based on the foregoing some have concluded that a “partisan” expert is
constitutionally required. E.g., John M. West, Expert Services and the Indigent Criminal
Defendant: The Constitutional Mandate of Ake v. Oklahoma, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1326, 1346
(1986).
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always coincide.136 A “battle of the experts” often ensues where the medical
profession is at its worst, and the jury oftentimes disregards the testimony of both
physicians in favor of the far less scientific lay testimony.137 While many argue that
the “battle of the experts” is the disease afflicting the criminal justice system,138 this
article argues that it is but a symptom of a larger problem, namely excessive
entanglement between medicine and criminal law.
Currently, psychiatric testimony is often unmoored from the hard psychiatric
science, and ventures into the realm of law and morality. This has caused some to
argue in favor of abandoning the introduction of psychiatric testimony altogether.139
On the other hand, psychiatric testimony is deemed to be quite useful in shedding
light on the mental processes of the accused, causing some to argue for psychiatrists
to be allowed to give their opinions on whether the accused could not “help himself”
in committing a crime.140 Neither of these two extremes is appropriate. Psychiatric
testimony is indeed quite useful if one uses it to elucidate defendant’s mental health.
However, such testimony is irrelevant if one is trying to affix responsibility. It then
follows that the testimony should be geared towards answering the first question. In
order to answer the question of defendant’s mental health, a psychiatrist needs to
confine himself to issues of medical fact. The testimony should resemble a
conversation between two psychiatrists upon a transfer of the patient. Thus issues
like diagnosis, treatment, signs and symptoms would be covered (as well as
reasoning for coming to a given conclusion) while issues of responsibility, morality
and future dangerousness will be left for others to testify to and decide. Testimony
thus limited would revolve around medical issues, i.e., those on which physicians
have a specialized knowledge. Not only would such testimony be more scientifically
sound,141 but also more ethically appropriate, as discussed in Part V. This approach
would allow the jury to hear testimony on issues that they may not be familiar with
(i.e., different psychiatric syndromes, manifestations of disease, etc) from an expert,
while precluding the expert from using his position to foist upon the jury his own
moral judgments, an issue on which he is no more an expert than a given juror.
The current level of actual psychiatric entanglement with the law is revealed
below.

136

See Ake, 407 U.S. at 81-82.

137

See supra notes 115-19 and accompanying text.
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E.g., Weihofen, Battle of the Experts, supra note 13; see also Thomas Mackey
(unpublished manuscript on file with the author).
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See, e.g., MARGARET A. HAGEN, WHORES OF THE COURT: THE FRAUD OF PSYCHIATRIC
TESTIMONY AND THE RAPE OF AMERICAN JUSTICE (1997); see also ALAN DERSHOWITZ, THE
ABUSE EXCUSE AND OTHER COP OUTS, SOB STORIES, AND EVASIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY 38
(1994) (calling psychiatric testimony “psychobabble”).
140

See, e.g., HENRY WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 286 (1954).
(Hereinafter, CRIMINAL DEFENSE); Cf. People v. Jones, 266 P.2d 38 (Cal. 1954) (allowing
psychiatric testimony on issue of defendant’s character because it can help in determining
whether one was a “sexual deviant”).
141

See infra note 192 and accompanying text.
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1. Competency to Stand Trial
At the earliest stage of the criminal proceedings, a psychiatrist can be used to
evaluate the patient to see if he is “competent” to stand trial.142 Competency is not a
medical term, but a legal one.143 A defendant is adjudged competent if “he has
sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of
rational understanding—and whether he has a rational as well as factual
understanding of the proceedings against him.”144 A finding of incompetence halts
all further proceedings indefinitely, until such time as competence can be regained.145
Up until relatively recently, a person found to be incompetent to stand trial would be
subject to a lifetime of commitment in a psychiatric institution in lieu of
punishment.146 This practice was disapproved by the Supreme Court in Jackson v.
Indiana.147 Today, a person found to be incompetent should be subject to
hospitalization only for a period of time necessary to determine the likelihood of
regaining competency.148 Indeed, hospitalization is not even required.149 The
observation and evaluation of an incompetent person can be done on an outpatient
basis.150 If at any point the psychiatrist believes that the defendant is able to meet the
competency standard,151 he must file a report with a court that will adjudicate
competence.152 In practice, such psychiatric determinations are almost always
deferred to.153
The evaluation is generally performed by a psychiatrist specifically designated by
the court154 and is done in the psychiatrist’s office, court clinic, or jail.155 Often the

142
Bloche, Psychiatry and Capital Punishment, supra note 126, at 311; Jeffrey A. Wertkin,
Competency to Stand Trial, 90 GEO. L. J. 1514, 1517 (2002).
143
Joanmarie I. Davoli, Still Stuck in the Cuckoo’s Nest: Why Do Courts Continue to Rely
on Antiquated Mental Illness Research? 69 TENN. L. REV. 987, 995-96 (2002).
144

Dusky v. U.S., 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam).
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See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 717 n. 1 (1972) (quoting Indiana statute dealing
with incompetence to stand trial. IND. CODE § 35-5-3-2 (1971)).
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Indeed it is this procedure that gave rise to Jackson’s complaint. Id. at 719.
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406 U.S. 715 (1972).

148

Id. at 738. Confinement however often does last significantly longer than the bare
minimum required to make a judgment on the issue. Nonetheless, essentially perpetual pretrial confinement is no longer practiced.
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See LAFAVE, supra note 8, at 368.
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See generally id.
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See supra, note 106 and accompanying text.
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See id. at 132.
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examination occurs at a mental institution.156 In either case, the examination is done
by a professional in government’s employ.157 The examining psychiatrist prepares a
report of the examination for the court with copies for the prosecuting and defense
counsel.158 A defendant may employ his own psychiatrist,159 but if a “battle of the
experts” ensues as a result of divergent findings between the court-appointed
“independent” expert, and the defendant-retained expert, the former is likely to be
given more credence by the court.160 Because of the awesome power that the courtappointed psychiatrist may have on the outcome of the case,161 the competing sides
may use the psychiatric examination and testimony to their own maximum advantage
regardless of the actual scientific underpinnings of such procedures.162 Some believe
that even the court itself, presumably the most impartial player in the system, may
utilize the process to avoid for example granting bail.163 Furthermore, there have
been accusations that courts use the competency evaluations to justify what it wants
to do with the defendant,164 and a psychiatrist may find himself used as a cover by
the court or prosecuting attorney.165
As competency is a legal standard and not a medical one,166 psychiatrists are torn
between the desires to have their work correspond to the acceptable scientific
standards on the one hand,167 and on the other hand to have the report fit within the
156
See, e.g., Bruce J. Winick, Restructuring Competency to Stand Trial, 32 UCLA L. REV.
921, 930 -32 (1985) (suggesting that the majority of evaluations are still done on inpatient
basis); Rodney J. Uphoff, The Role of the Criminal Defense Lawyer in Representing the
Mentally Impaired Defendant: Zealous Advocate or Officer of the Court?, 1988 WIS. L. REV.
65, 71 n. 3 (1988). But see W. Lawrence Fitch & Susan R. Steinberg, Competency to Stand
Trial and Criminal Responsibility, 36-FEB. MD. B. J.14, 18 (2003) (stating that in Maryland
defendants first undergo a “screening evaluation” and only if there are any questions after such
evaluation, an inpatient observation is ordered).
157

GOLDSTEIN, supra note 8, at 131.
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Id. 131-36.
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LAFAVE, supra note 8, at 372.
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Weihofen, Battle of the Experts, supra note 13, at 967-68.
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See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 8, at 132-33.
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See C.R. JEFFERY, CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY AND MENTAL DISEASE 159 (1st 1967);
LAFAVE, supra note 7, at 363 (“It is to the advantage of both prosecutor and the defense to
have the defendant examined by a psychiatrist whose orientation and examination procedures
are such as will probably support their side of the case.”); Cf. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 8, at 134
(stating that psychiatrist’s own views on theory of psychiatry as a science play (or should
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DEBATE 104 (Richard J. Bonnie ed. 1977).
164

Id. at 105.

165

Id.

166

Davoli, supra note 143, at 995-96.

167

See JUSTIN W. POLIER, THE RULE OF LAW AND THE ROLE OF PSYCHIATRY 15 (1968).

2002-03]

A HEALER OR AN EXECUTIONER?

185

legal framework of “incompetence.”168 A professional so “divided against himself”
cannot for long maintain the high code of medical ethics and is prone to slip to a
position where he becomes more than an impartial scientist or a healer, but an
advocate for one side in a legal argument.
2. Testimony at Trial
The second point at which psychiatrists get involved with the criminal justice
system is at trial,169 testifying for either the defense or the prosecution as to the
defendant’s culpability in his criminal act.170 The psychiatric testimony as to
culpability centers on the insanity rules outlined in Part II, supra. At trial,
psychiatric testimony oftentimes becomes a “battle of the experts,”171 (usually more
so than at the “incompetence” stage)172 where the court and jury are trying to
elucidate the psychiatrist’s professional medical opinion on essentially a legal
issue.173 Psychiatrists are expected to testify not only to the mental state of an
individual, i.e., whether or not an individual suffers from mental disease (a relatively
objective medical diagnosis), but also on whether or not the defendant is insane (a
strictly legal term, bounded by the insanity defense rules).174
Traditionally, neither physicians nor lay witnesses were allowed to testify on the
“ultimate question,” i.e., whether the defendant is “responsible.”175 This prohibition
has survived to the present day,176 although, perhaps in name and form only, rather
than substance.177 The reason for refusing to entertain psychiatrists’ testimony on the
issue of responsibility stems from the idea that responsibility is a legal finding that
the jury cannot cede to any individual or even a panel of experts.178 Traditionally,

168

Id.

169

Bloche, Psychiatry and Capital Punishment, supra note 126, at 312.

170

GOLDSTEIN, supra note 8, at 124.
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Id. 103-04.
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This is due to the fact that at the “competence” stage the defendant is often examined by
a court appointed, “independent” psychiatrist whose opinion carry great weight. See supra
notes 152-60 and the accompanying text.
173

As can be expected, the psychiatrist’s expertise is in medical issues of mental illness.
The jury however has to come to a legal conclusion as to responsibility. Thus, whenever a
psychiatrist is asked questions, issues such as “whether the defendant was responsible” or
“could appreciate his actions,” he is rendering an opinion on a legal issue while armed only
with medical expertise.
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GOLDSTEIN, supra note 8, at 97.
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See, e.g., FED.R. EVID. 704(b); United States v. Hillsberg, 812 F.2d 328, 331-32 (7th
Cir. 1987); United States v. Felak, 831 F.2d 794, 797 (8th Cir. 1987).
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notes 178-87 and accompanying text.
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psychiatrists were also not allowed to testify as to “test questions,”179 i.e., whether
the defendant satisfied the requisite test for insanity (e.g., whether the defendant
knew right from wrong).180 Thus, psychiatric testimony was limited essentially to
medical issues.181 Again, the reason that was advanced for keeping psychiatrists
from testifying about appreciation of “right and wrong” (or any other legal standard
for that matter) is that the jury and not a witness (expert or otherwise) should be the
ultimate judge on this issue.182
Notwithstanding the above objections, recently, the courts have been more and
more tolerant of psychiatrists being asked and answering “test questions.”183 Indeed,
allowing testimony on “test questions” is the rule in the majority of jurisdictions.184
The Model Penal Code allows an expert (presumably a mental health professional) to
testify as to the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the nature and/or criminality
of his conduct.185 The proponents of this new rule respond to the objections of the
years past by suggesting that the jury would be better served and better informed by
“expert” testimony.186 This view, however, fails to take into account the reality that
when psychiatrists are asked to testify on “test questions,” the defense and
prosecution “experts” will almost invariably come to different conclusions.187 When
such divergent views are presented to the jury, the jury “tend[s] to supplant the
factual detail upon which the decision for responsibility should ideally be based. …
The jury is left with the impression that it must choose between the experts…”188
The jury, if convinced that the defendant is sane, will presumably rely (at least to
some extent) on the testimony of the psychiatrist for the state.189 Thus, this
testimony would be one of the reasons of someone being sent to jail. On the other
hand, the jury, if convinced the defendant is insane, will presumably base its findings
(at least in part) on the testimony of a defense psychiatrist. In this case, the
psychiatrist’s testimony will be responsible for potentially letting a criminal, or at the

179

See, e.g., State v. McCann, 47 S.W.2d 95 (1932).

180

LAFAVE, supra note 8, at 378.
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If the experts were to come to the same conclusion the need for trial would be obviated,
as prosecution is unlikely try a case where the defendant would be pronounced insane even by
the state expert. Alternatively, if the defense expert found the defendant sane, the counsel for
the defense is unlikely to call such expert to the stand.
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very least, a dangerous human being, roam free in an unprotected society.190 In both
cases, psychiatrists face an ethical dilemma as to the appropriate course of action,
and this article proposes a solution to this ethical quandary. Additionally, of course,
the standards for “insanity” are different between the different courts,191 and thus
psychiatrists are almost forced to come to different conclusions on sanity in different
jurisdictions, even though these conclusions are based on the same clinical data. In a
scientific world to which psychiatrists belong by virtue of their belonging to the
medical profession, identical data should lead to identical results.192 When the
identical data leads to divergent results, the conclusion is inescapable that something
other than a scientific approach to the clinical problem at hand has taken place. If
that is indeed true, then the psychiatrists involved are not living up to the standards
of their profession.
3. Competency at Execution
Even if an accused is found competent to stand trial, and then found guilty (i.e.,
either does not raise or is not successful in his insanity defense) and is sentenced to
death, he cannot be executed if he ceases being competent at any time between the
verdict and the carrying out of the sentence.193 It is then of no surprise that the
question of competence arises quite often in the context of execution.194 Psychiatrists
are again called on to examine the prisoner and to render their expert opinion on the
matter.195
The involvement of psychiatrists in competency for execution adjudication is
nothing new, but until the 1980s, the involvement was rather low profile.196 One of
the reasons was that in years gone by executions occurred quite soon after trial, so
there was little need for an evaluation separate from that conducted prior to trial.197
Additionally, any deterioration that used to occur prior to the advent of psychotropic
medication was the result of progressing disease.198 Typically, unmedicated disease
was slow to progress,199 and thus a person who was competent to stand trial would
190
Granted, in most instances NGRI acquittees are civilly confined. See infra, notes 24677 and the accompanying text. However, the possibility does exist that such release will
occur.
191

See supra, notes 113-14 and the accompanying text.
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The very definition of a valid scientific experiment is that it is reproducible. If one
cannot come to the same result using the same data, the experiment is not considered valid.
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Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).

194

It is not for this article to debate whether all, some or none of these claims of
incompetence are genuine. What this article does suggest that given the stakes, it is possible
and indeed desirable (from the point of view of the condemned) to attempt to manipulate the
system, and enlist help of the psychiatrist in the process.
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likely remain competent at the time of the execution.200 By contrast, after the advent
of antipsychotic medication, post-trial deterioration could well be the result of
withdrawing medication.201 The deterioration in such circumstances was much more
rapid;202 the prisoner who was quite competent to stand trial could rapidly become
incompetent thereafter if the medications were withdrawn.203 Because of the above
possibility, the State had to institute a separate procedure to evaluate competence
prior to execution.204
The procedures established in response to the need for separate competency
evaluation prior to execution were originally quite informal.205 Not until Ford v.
Wainwright206 was decided in 1986, establishing a constitutional prohibition on
executing the insane, was there a requirement for any adjudicatory proceedings in the
matter.207 Indeed, as late as the 1950s, the Court viewed execution reprieves as no
different from other clemency issues, best left to the discretion of the executive.208
The executive could base his decision on psychiatric reports, but was not required to
do so.209 Psychiatrists were then just advisors to the executive authority.210
Additionally, psychiatrists could simply subvert the justice system by refusing to
notify prison authorities of any improvement in mental health of the prisoners in
their care.211 Once a warden ordered a transfer of a prisoner to a psychiatric unit, the

200

Id. Although competency for execution may not be the same as competency to stand
trial, given the very low threshold for the former, one is likely to satisfy it if one is competent
to stand trial. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 421 (Powell, J., concurring) (stating that
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supra note 8, at 362.
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psychiatrist in charge could simply keep him there indefinitely, thus essentially
“lifting” the death sentence.212
After Ford, the procedure for evaluating pre-execution competence has become
more formalized and vested in the judicial as opposed to the executive branch.213
The procedure today is very similar to a trial.214 That decision requires that a hearing
be held in order to determine competency for execution; and that such hearing is to
be a de novo review of the incompetence claim.215 As it is now an evidentiary
hearing, by its very nature it requires evidence to be adduced. Thus, psychiatrists are
given yet another opportunity to participate in a legal process, with all the trap doors
attendant thereto.
4. Medicating the Prisoners
Psychiatrists can also be involved in the criminal justice system outside of the
courthouse (albeit still within the criminal justice system). The criminal justice
system uses psychiatrists in order to provide medical regimens to inmates.216 The
most common use is for psychiatrists to medicate those individuals who suffer from
some sort of mental disease, but are confined in mental institutions. However,
psychiatrists are also used to administer medications to incompetent individuals, in
hopes of making them competent to stand trial,217 as well as occasionally, to make
them competent enough to be executed.218 In two recent decisions, the criminal
justice system has deemed the use of psychiatrists to involuntarily administer
medications to be acceptable and indeed desirable,219 a proposition that at least at
first glance does not correspond to the “primum non nocere” norm of medical
ethics.220
The most authoritative, albeit incomplete, pronouncement on the issue of pre-trial
forced medication came in 1992. In Riggins v. Nevada,221 the defendant (petitioner)
was medicated against his will, was convicted, sentenced to die, and then challenged
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Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (holding that it is
constitutionally permissible to forcefully medicate a prisoner in order to restore competency
for execution); United States v. Sell, 282 F.3d 560 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that it is
constitutionally permissible to forcefully medicate a prisoner in order to restore competency to
stand trial).
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his conviction and sentence on the grounds that forcible medication was used.222 The
Court refused to allow such medication when the state could not show that
medication was needed to maintain competence,223 and/or that less drastic
alternatives were unavailable.224 The Court noted that pre-trial medication is
impermissible “absent a finding of overriding justification and… medical
appropriateness.”225 (It is noteworthy that the Court did not say medical necessity).226
As there was no showing in Riggins that the trial could not proceed absent
medication,227 the first prong was not satisfied.
It is far from clear what the Court meant when it said “medically appropriate.”
The minimalist approach to this statement would simply evaluate the efficacy of
treatment offered. Thus, if a given medication restores competence it is medically
appropriate. This however, does not take into account the patient’s own wishes. In a
broader sense, no treatment unless consented to is appropriate for a given patient, no
matter how efficacious it may be. To say otherwise would be to start on a slippery
slope towards such “treatments” as forced sterilization. They are most certainly
“medically appropriate” in a sense that they are highly efficacious in achieving their
goal of limiting certain individual’s reproductive ability. Nevertheless, one is hardpressed to state that these “treatments” are indeed “appropriate.” Thus, unless there
is an emergent circumstance, where lives are threatened or where patient’s consent
cannot be obtained, an unconsented treatment should not be considered “medically
appropriate.”
The issue of whether it is legal to medicate someone for the sole purpose of
restoring competence to stand trial is currently before the Supreme Court.228 The
Eight Circuit Court of Appeals has held that such use of medical knowledge is
appropriate.229 In Sell v. United States,230 a split panel of the Eighth Circuit held that
the government’s interest in bringing an incompetent defendant to trial is a sufficient
reason to have him medicated against his will.231 (As the defendant was
222

Id. at 129-31.
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See id. at 138 (“[T]he record contains no finding that might support a conclusion that
administration of antipsychotic medication was necessary to accomplish an essential state
policy…”). The decision on this issue was reserved for another day. See id. at 135 (“[T]he
State might have been able to justify medically appropriate, involuntary treatment with the
drug by establishing that it could not obtain an adjudication of Riggins’ guilt or innocence by
using less intrusive means.”) The Court may address it this Term in Sell v. United States, 123
S. Ct. 512 (2002) (order granting certiorari).
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incompetent,232 and as competency could be, at least potentially, restored via
medication,233 the “medical appropriateness” prong was satisfied, at least insofar as
the treatment was efficacious).234 In that case the court acknowledged that there was
no reason, such as danger to self or others, except the desire to bring the prisoner to
trial, that would necessitate medication.235 The court’s reasoning allows psychiatrists
to be employed for purposes that although medically appropriate,236 would go against
the interest of the patient insofar as retention of autonomy over medical decisions is
a primary interest.
Shortly following the Sell decision, the Eighth Circuit also dealt with the issue of
whether it is permissible to medicate someone against his will solely for the purpose
of having an individual regain competence for execution.237 In Singleton v. Norris,238
a 6-5 majority (hearing the case en banc) held that indeed this too is permissible.239
If Sell could be defended on the grounds that at the very least the defendant once
restored to competency will be able to live a “normal” life (albeit behind bars),
Singleton suggests that psychiatric knowledge can be used for the purposes of ending
life.240 This is inimical to all the training and education that physicians get, and is no
different than a physician directly administering lethal drugs in an execution
setting.241
5. Treating the Acquitted
Perhaps the most “medical”242 of all points of psychiatric involvement in the
criminal justice system is the treatment of NGRI acquittees. Some jurisdictions
exercise mandatory commitment following an NGRI acquittal,243 and some
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235
Id. at 568. The court only dealt with the Government’s interest in bringing the
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infra.
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Id. at 1036-37 (Jeaney, J., dissenting).
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See, e.g., David A. Rothstein, M.D., Letter to the Editor, 20 Newsl. Am. Acad.
Psychiatry & L. 111, 112 (1995). See also infra, Part V.A.
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“Medical” in a sense that the NGRI acquittees are treated as any other patient confined
to a mental institution would be. Although, obviously the acquittees are in the hospital
involuntarily, their medical regimen does not depend on their status. In this sense,
psychiatrists do not act as extensors of the penal system whose primary purpose is to advance
penological interests, but instead as physicians who care for the ill.
243
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permissive.244 The goals served by commitment are two-fold. One, as mentioned in
Part II, supra, is restraint of those individuals who commit crimes as a result of their
illness.245 The other is to treat and rehabilitate (in the medical sense of the word)
these mentally ill individuals. These two goals do not always coincide; consequently
psychiatrists at least occasionally end up treating people in a manner that is
suboptimal for the clinical presentation.246 In these instances it is rather clear that
psychiatrists are not practicing good medicine, instead they are serving as mere
extensions of the penal system.
C. The Consequences of Being Adjudged Insane
Irrespective of what test the courts have used, the tradition that those suffering
from “insanity” should not be held criminally responsible is a deeply rooted one.247
If the defendant satisfied the test du jour, he would not be liable to criminal
sanctions.248 The rationale for such treatment of the insane is manifold and has
changed with the times. As noted above, for many years it was thought to be
improper to punish a child who couldn’t reason (at least according to the Bible).249
Consequently, it was just as improper to punish someone who was nothing more than
a child.250 Throughout the years, another notion, that it is rather pointless to
administer punishment to someone who will learn nothing from such punishment and
will not be deterred from further criminal activity as a result of his insanity, has
taken hold.251
Originally (i.e., in the medieval times), those found to be of “unsound mind” at
the time of the commission of the crime were not held criminally liable, and could be
free to conduct their lives as any other person would have,252 except that at least until
the seventeenth century the property of the defendant so acquitted was still subject to
forfeiture.253 The check on such release of dangerous elements into society was the
fact that under early tests for “madness” very few dangerous individuals were
acquitted.254 The degree of “madness” to be demonstrated had to be truly extreme in
244
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permissive jurisdictions. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 8, at 145.
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order to be exculpated, and few defendants satisfied the test.255 However, those that
did satisfy the test were indeed released.
Although the defendants were not held criminally liable, they were not
“acquitted” in the full sense of the word.256 Instead, the jury rendered a verdict of
guilty, together with the special verdict of “lunacy,” and the combination of these
two verdicts invariably led to a Royal Pardon.257 The prisoner was then released with
no other special provisions for his care.258 In 1800, however, the Criminal Lunatics
Act required those defendants found “mad” to be committed to a secure institution
“until His Majesty’s pleasure be known.”259
This was the beginning of
institutionalizing the criminally insane. It is worth noting that the institutionalization
was for an indefinite260 (and potentially life-long) period even in cases where the
incarceration in prison would have been of a relatively short duration.261 Indeed, the
defendant in one of the most celebrated cases of that time (the very case that
prompted the passage of the Criminal Lunatics Act), James Hadfield, was acquitted
of trying to assassinate the King,262 but was nonetheless committed to Bethlem
Hospital.263 That the purpose of such confinement was not to treat but to
preventively detain,264 can be evidenced from the very language of the statute. The
Act notably did not call for detainment until “return to sanity,” but rather until the
King chose to release the prisoner.
Indeed, it has been said that in the Victorian England “most criminal lunatics
remained in gaol.”265 But even when lunatics were separated from the general prison
population and institutionalized in separate institutions, the confinement in these
secure institutions often did not differ much from prison.266
255
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262

See supra, notes 60-75 and accompanying text.

263

Halpern, supra notes 252, at 1132.

264
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another shot at the King”) (quoting Ralph Partridge, Broadmoor 1 (1953)).
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23 (1981).
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For example, Maryland allowed “mental defectives” (not the NGRI acquittees, but
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Similar treatment was accorded to lunatics in other countries as well. For
instance, in China, where “madness” was never an exculpation, but grounds for
sentence mitigation,267 starting in the 17th century, those deemed to be “mad” were
released into the custody of their family.268 The people so released had to be kept
manacled,269 and the family, under the threat of a rather severe punishment, had to
control the individual.270 However, this “humane” treatment of the insane soon gave
way to forced registration and institutionalization.271 As in England, in China the
original intent of the confinement was not to treat, but to isolate dangerous
individuals from the society.272
The requirement of post-NGRI acquittal confinement largely persists to this
day.273 Although the stated goal of confinement today is medical cure,274 as opposed
to the former goal of isolation, confinement and psychiatrists are too often used for
purposes other than treatment.275 Too often, irrespective of the committed person’s
actual state of mind, the commitment is continued.276 Furthermore, the psychiatric
profession at times advocated continued commitment of those individuals who have
retained their “sanity” but continue to manifest “personality disorders.”277 This type
of treatment suggests that the true goal behind institutionalization is punitive rather
than rehabilitative in nature. The courts have not been shy in ignoring psychiatric
recommendations for release in those who reacquired their sanity. For example, in
Francois v. Henderson,278 the judge refused to release a patient who for over five
years exhibited no symptoms of mental disease or other abnormalities on the ground
267
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that such behavior is indeed evidence of mental illness, as the prisoner is faking
sanity!279
While it can be argued that the mentally ill ought to be punished, it is the
contention of this article that even so, it is still wholly improper to use medical
professionals to mete out the punishment. The above statement applies with equal
force irrespective of whether the patient is confined in a mental institution or has his
liberty otherwise restricted (e.g., by having to participate in an outpatient program) if
such restriction serves no legitimate medical end.
As can be seen from some of the above examples, psychiatric involvement have
not eliminated arbitrariness or brought about an exclusively scientific approach to the
mental health problems encountered in the criminal justice system. Instead, medical
pronouncements are used to cloak judicial preferences with a mantle of scientific
legitimacy. A physician thus used becomes an instrument of the penal system as
opposed to a healer or even a scientist in search of truth. Such a system cannot be
deemed to be satisfactory.
IV. INDEPENDENT PANELS-AN UNACCEPTABLE SOLUTION
Some have argued that the underlying problem with the American conception of
the psychiatry-criminal justice interaction is that it relies on independent witnesses
for the defense and prosecution.280 It is argued that by being a witness for either side
the psychiatrist has a stake in the outcome, and that in and of itself is
unprofessional.281 The proposed solution is replacing “hired guns” with an
independent panel, composed of a number of psychiatrists whose conclusions are to
be accepted by the court.282 The argument goes as follows: Because the psychiatrists
are independent they would not have a stake in the outcome, and because there
would be no “hired guns,” there would be no “expert battles,” an affair that
diminishes the medical profession as a whole.283 For the reasons set forth below, it is
the contention of this author that this solution would not solve the fundamental
problem of medical professionals operating outside of their area of expertise, and
beyond what can be considered ethical medical behavior.
As can be imagined, the American system of psychiatric involvement in the
adjudicatory process is not the only option available, and has not been universally
embraced. The former Soviet Union,284 the People’s Republic of China,285 and

279
See id. at 235 (One of the physicians testified that sanity can be feigned, albeit he
qualified that by stating it is unlikely that such feigning can go on for more than a few hours.
The trial court, relying on the testimony of that physician, declined to release Francois
anyway).
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USSR’s successor, the Russian Federation286 are but a few states that employ
different process and procedures to separate the competent from the incompetent and
the sane from the insane. This section will describe the operation of the system and
highlight a specific case to show that merely switching from partisan experts to
independent panels is unlikely to resolve the problem of psychiatrists straying
beyond medical issues and on to the field of moral judgments about the accused.
A. Psychiatric Evaluation in the Soviet Criminal Justice System
In the USSR, the court or the Procuracy287 could order a psychiatric examination
of the accused. The examination was conducted by a team of psychiatrists288
appointed by the court (or Procuracy). The team consisted of three experts who
conducted their evaluation based on the guidelines published by Serbsky Institute of
Forensic Psychiatry.289 Following such guidelines was mandatory.290 The patientaccused was not entitled to challenge the proceedings in any way, either in person,
through counsel, or through family.291 The team of psychiatrists was asked to
address several questions. First, does the accused suffer from any mental illness?
Second, is his illness such that he did not “realize the significance of his actions” or
that he “could not control them?” Finally, and most troubling, the psychiatrists were
asked whether the accused was “socially dangerous.” The reason the second and
third questions are troubling is because both of them ask a psychiatrist to pass on a
legal proposition. Medical knowledge is either irrelevant or of very little use in
answering these questions. The answer to these questions is likely to be based on the
psychiatrist’s worldview (e.g., what constitutes danger to his society)292 as opposed
to any scientific fact or criterion.
The findings of the forensic psychiatrists were submitted to the court293 that held
a summary, often ex parte hearing where it determined whether to accept the
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findings and recommendations.294 In practice the reports were never challenged,295
and the determinations of the psychiatrists were accepted.296
In this system, the psychiatrists are again employed in a way that requires them to
make pronouncements on the issue of legal responsibility.297 Granted, no “battle of
the experts” ensues,298 as the only report of any significance is that submitted by the
“independent” medical experts,299 but nonetheless, the medical profession takes upon
itself tasks that it is not designed to handle, while the legal profession cedes its
authority and expertise to professionals from another field.
The abuse of psychiatry in the Soviet Union has been well-documented300 and
this article will not dwell on its nature. There are now an increasing number of
reports that similar misuse of psychiatry occurs in the People’s Republic of China,301
among other countries. It is hardly surprising that a repressive regime would attempt
to use medicine for its own means.302 However, with a process outlined above in
place, a country need not be repressive for the science of psychiatry to be put to use
in an area beyond its scope of expertise, thus perverting the science by asking it to
make scientifically unsupported judgments.303 With this system of psychiatric
participation, psychiatrists invariably will and do attach their own values to the
evaluation of the accused.304 An “independent” psychiatrist is essentially given a
free hand to project his personal and societal sympathies and antipathies onto a
patient and to have his “scientific” conclusion mirror his moral world outlook.305 Of
course in a repressive regime, a psychiatrist whose moral outlook mirrors that of a
political accused is unlikely to find himself as one of the examining experts.306
294
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Nevertheless, the underlying problem remains the same irrespective of what views
psychiatrists actually hold.
The fact that a system need not be repressive or have procedures shrouded in
secrecy (as they were in Soviet times) in order to enmesh the medical profession and
its “independent experts” in a legal and political quagmire, is best illustrated by the
recent and ongoing case of Russian Colonel Yuri Budanov.
B. The Case of Colonel Yuri Budanov
Colonel Budanov was a senior federal (i.e., Russian government) military officer
engaged in the military operations in the breakaway republic of Chechnya.307 In
March 2000, while conducting a military operation, Mr. Budanov captured,
kidnapped and strangled Elza Kungaeva, an 18-year old Chechen girl.308 The colonel
was indicted on charges of exceeding authority,309 kidnapping,310 rape311 (later
dropped),312 and murder.313 Originally, the defense claimed that the girl was a
sniper,314 and a part of a terrorist network; consequently, Budanov did not commit
murder, but merely exceeded his authority by killing her.315 However, later, the
defense claimed that at any rate, Col. Budanov was “nevmeniaem”316 at the time of
the crime.317 In the context of the plea it signified a claim that at the time of the
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See Michael R. Gordon, Russian Troops in Chechnya Find Little Quiet on the Southern
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crime the colonel was in such a mental state as to prevent him from understanding
his actions.
The case was complicated by several political considerations. First, the Russian
government vehemently denied any human rights abuses in Chechnya.318 Second, up
until the episode with Ms. Kungaeva, Col. Budanov was a model and decorated
officer,319 and a hero to many; thus any aspersions upon him were often viewed as
casting a pall over the entire Russian Army.320 It is in this situation that the court had
to work.
As required by law, Mr. Budanov was sent to undergo a psychiatric evaluation.321
Local psychiatrists viewed him as completely sane and thus responsible for his
actions.322 A second evaluation was then ordered.323 The results of this second
examination were never officially revealed.324 A third assessment of the colonel was
then conducted,325 this time at Moscow’s prestigious Serbsky Institute for Forensic
Psychiatry,326 home to the most pre-eminent specialists in the field in all of the
Russian Federation. The physicians from that evaluation concluded that Budanov
was not able to realize the significance of his actions.327 Thus, the court was faced
with two contradictory psychiatric conclusions. Instead of querying the experts or
allowing for their direct and cross-examination, the court at the behest of attorneys
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claimed that the Budanov is accused only because of “ideological intervention of the West
against Russia.”) (last visited Apr. 14, 2003); http://www.rambler.ru/db/news/
msg.html?mid=3242284&s=11 (Up to 50% of Russians believe that Budanov is not guilty of
murder) (last visited Apr. 14, 2003).
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http://www.rambler.ru/db/news/msg.html?mid=1230830&s=2 (last visited Apr. 14,

2003)
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http://www.gazeta.ru/2002/12/31/budanovprizn.shtml (last visited Apr. 14, 2003).
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See http://www.rambler.ru/db/news/msg.html?mid=2355527&s=9 (mentioning second
evaluation) (last visited Apr. 14, 2003).
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See id. (Judge refusing to reveal the results of the evaluation) (last visited Apr. 14,

2003).
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http://www.rambler.ru/db/news/msg.html?mid=3242565&s=11 (last visited Apr. 14,

2003).
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http://www.rambler.ru/db/news/msg.html?mid=1944662&s=10 (last visited Apr. 14,
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representing the family of the victim328 ordered a fourth exam.329 This exam was
again conducted at the Serbsky Institute,330 and (unsurprisingly) again resulted in the
finding of insanity at the time of the offense.331 Indeed, this fourth opinion stated
that all previous studies underestimated the true nature of Budanov’s illness.332
Again the experts were not questioned, and although both the prosecution and the
victim’s counsel objected to the findings of the experts, the court accepted them
without any hesitation,333 and acquitted Col. Budanov.334
It cannot go unsaid that the last evaluation of the colonel occurred at the time
when Chechen terrorists seized a Moscow theater along with several hundred
hostages.335 Although this may be mere coincidence, the possibility that this event
that shocked Russia played a role in the psychiatrist’s evaluation cannot be
discounted. The psychiatrists once again were given the opportunity to project their
personal feeling towards the war in Chechnya, towards Chechen resistance fighters
(or terrorists, depending on one’s point of view), on acceptable methods of
combating terrorism, on the Russian Army, and on Chechens in general. Far be it
from the author of this article to accuse these psychiatrists of actually succumbing to
328
Russian law provides for the victim or his family to be a part of a criminal prosecution.
Indeed, even if the state prosecution and defense are satisfied with the outcome of the case, the
victim’s attorney can still appeal. UK RF § 45.
329

http://www.rambler.ru/db/news/msg.html?mid=2634075&s=10 (last visited Apr. 14,

2003).
330

Id.

331

http://www.rambler.ru/db/news/msg.html?mid=3051705&s=11 (last visited Apr. 14,

2003).
332

http://www.rambler.ru/db/news/msg.html?mid=3051704&s=11 (last visited Apr. 14,

2003).
333

http://www.rambler.ru/db/news/msg.html?mid=3090899&s=11
(The
court
characterized the psychiatric conclusion merely as “scientifically sound” and based on such
finding declared Col. Budanov was “nevmeniaem” at the time of the crime.) (last visited Apr.
14, 2003).
334

On February 28th, 2003, the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of Russian
Federation set aside the decision of the lower court as procedurally erroneous, and remanded
the case back to that court. It further ordered that the case be tried before a different panel of
judges. Michael Wines, Russia Orders a New Trial In Chechnya Murder Case, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 1, 2003 at A4.
335
See Michael Wines, Chechens Seize Moscow Theater, Taking as Many as 600
Hostages, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2002, at A1; Michael Wines, Russia Recaptures Theater After
Chechen Rebel Group Begins to Execute Hostages, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2002, at A1. The
fourth evaluation was conducted sometime between July 21, 2002 (the date when Budanov
was sent from Rostov-on-Don, where he was tried, to Moscow, where he was evaluated) and
September 29, 2002 (when the evaluation ended).
http://www.rambler.ru/db/news/
msg.html?mid=2826637&s=10 (last visited Apr. 14, 2003). Although the evaluation was
completed September 29, the report was not submitted until November, creating the possibility
that the hostage situation in Moscow influenced the examiners’ findings. No such accusations
are being levied, but the mere possibility is quite troubling. http://www.rambler.ru/db/
news/msg.html?mid=3251957&s=2 (stating that on November 18, 2002 all documents relating
to the evaluation were completed and forwarded to the court) (last visited Apr. 14, 2003).
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the opportunity; however, it is the author’s view that such opportunity should never
be presented, lest the temptation is too great. Regardless of how conscientious and
upright an individual is, when asked a question of morals he will almost inevitably
incorporate his life’s experience, political leanings, and social views into the answer.
It is at this point that the physician stops being a healer and ends up being a part of
the criminal justice system, and such a transformation is incompatible with medical
ethics. Granted, a physician may tailor his medical opinions to fit within a given
political situation as well; however, medical opinions that are “tailored” to politics
can be easier exposed than moral opinions. As medical opinions are based in science
(even if not fully precise science), the falsity of testimony not grounded in science
can be rebutted by someone who is an expert in a given field of medicine. A moral
opinion cannot be false by definition, and therefore cannot be rebutted.
The Soviet-Russian system of independent psychiatric panels at its core is no
more objectionable from the viewpoint of medical ethics or legal policy than the
American system of witnesses for either side, so long as it is limited strictly to the
diagnosis of the disease. However, once psychiatrists start operating in the land of
morals, and in the realm of right and wrong, they are acting contrary to medical
ethics regardless of what system they participate in.
V. ETHICAL PRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRY WITHIN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
Psychiatrists serve multiple roles in the criminal justice system. They are treating
physicians, scientists who investigate and report, state employees, representatives of
the medical profession in general, and citizens possessed of special knowledge that
may be useful to the courts of law. With so many hats to wear, psychiatrists
potentially have several allegiances. The question then is to whom do they own their
loyalty in cases when there is a conflict of loyalties. Some have suggested that
because of the numerous incarnations of a forensic physician, a new ethical paradigm
be adopted, one that is different from the traditional ethical duties of “primum non
nocere.”
One alternative advanced is the ethics of “truth.”336 According to Paul
Appelbaum, the leading advocate of the “ethics of truth” the doctor is acting
ethically so long as he is objectively evaluating a patient, and then testifies as to his
findings.337 Under this theory, it is irrelevant what the outcome of such testimony
would be, so long as the testifying physician was striving for scientific truth.338 The
problem with this approach is that it essentially subsumes all of the forensic
psychiatrist’s roles into one role of a researcher. This approach may very well work
for a forensic pathologist, who merely evaluates evidence (be it bullet trajectory, bite
marks, or whatever else) and presents his testimony based on evaluation of such
rather impersonal evidence. The theory does not work for forensic psychiatry,
because evidence is the live person, and evaluation of evidence (at least in order to
get a full and complete picture) necessarily involves evaluation of an individual.
When such evaluation occurs, the individual being evaluated becomes (however

336

See, e.g., Paul Appelbaum, Psychiatric Ethics in the Courtroom, 12 BULL. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 225 (1984).
337

Id.

338

Id.
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briefly) a patient of the evaluator.339 If that is so, the evaluator’s duties with respect
to that individual must be no different than any other physician’s duties to any other
patient.
The approach that makes the forensic psychiatrist owe primary allegiance to the
patient, does not ignore forensic psychiatrist’s other duties, i.e., the one he owes to
the state (his employer), the public at large, and the medical profession. Instead, this
approach suggests that whenever there is a physician-patient interaction (even if no
treatment or further interactions are offered or contemplated) the physician’s
obligation to a given patient takes primacy.
Accepting the above proposition, this article relies on twin principles of “no
harm”340 and “consent”341 to build a foundation of ethical behavior by psychiatrists.
Additionally, the “professionalism” principle is a “final check” to be employed once
the other two are satisfied. Utilizing these principles, the psychiatrist does not
compromise his duties to the patient, while the justice system is not robbed of the
wisdom and knowledge of science.
A. Basic Principles
The two principles of ethical behavior by psychiatrists are complementary and
can hardly work one without one another. Yet for ease of understanding and
structure, they will be discussed separately.
1. The “No Harm” Principle
Before a physician embarks on a course of action with a given patient he must
pose a question to himself. The question should ask whether the procedure or action
sought to be undertaken is medically appropriate.342 If the proposed procedure is not
medically appropriate, then it can be said that no medical benefit is derived from
it.343 If no medical benefit accrues, it can be inferred that medical harm results. It
results either from the progress of the disease in the face of wrong treatment or from

339

See David A. Rothstein, M.D., Psychiatrists’Involvement in Executions: Arriving at an
Official Position, 20 NEWSLETTER AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 15, 17 (1995) (“anyone acting
in a capacity that requires a psychiatrist's education, judgment, and experience is, in that role,
practicing psychiatry.”) If someone is practicing psychiatry, it then follows, that one is acting
as a physician. If that is so, one must assume all the duties and moral obligations of a
physician.
340

This principle is derived from the Hippocratic Oath that states, in part “I will prescribe
regimen for the good of my patients according to my ability and my judgment and never do
harm to anyone.” STEADMAN’S MED. DICTIONARY 799 (26th ed.) (1995).
341

The idea that a patient must consent to treatment derives from the Kantian notion that a
person can never be a means to an end. If treatment is undertaken without consent, a person is
used as a means towards the end of better health. In order for the person to be the end, not
merely a means to an end, he must want to participate in a given activity, i.e., he must consent.
The notion of consent also derives in part from the common law of battery. See Cruzan ex rel.
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990).
342

Medically appropriate here means efficacious and within accepted medical practice.

343

There may be a “satisfaction” benefit to a patient who requests the procedure as a result
of having his wishes fulfilled. This will be discussed shortly.
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the side-effects of the treatment itself. In these situations medical harm outweighs
medical benefit.
The question then arises, does not the patient experience a benefit from having
his wishes followed if he requests a treatment that the physician believes to be futile
or otherwise incorrect, and if so, does that benefit not balance the harm? The answer
suggested here is “no.” A patient’s consent is necessary344 but insufficient for a
physician to initiate treatment. The “primum non nocere” principle as envisioned
here requires a physician using his specialized knowledge to evaluate scientific risks
and benefits and satisfy himself that the risks are medically acceptable. If he cannot
so satisfy himself, it should not matter what the patient’s desires are. Once the
physician does satisfy himself that the risks are medically acceptable, he then
proceeds to enquire of the patient whether the patient is willing to undergo these
risks.
To borrow on an example used in Part III.A.4, it is not unethical for a physician
to participate in a procedure that results in sterilization of someone, because such
procedure is efficacious. However, prior to engaging in such a procedure, he must
obtain a patient’s consent.345 A physician’s evaluation of clinical harms and benefits
is therefore a condition precedent for taking any further actions.
This reasoning applies only to medical (physiologic) issues, because it is on these
issues that a physician has expertise, and can with reasonable scientific certainty
predict possible outcomes. On the other hand, a physician has no expertise in
matters outside of medicine, and thus cannot as readily identify or valuate nonphysiologic harm. In these matters, the valuation must reside with the patient.346
When the issue is so framed, one needs to ask what qualifies as “harm?” Hardly
a clinical intervention occurs that does not result in some clinical side-effect (mostly
of harmful nature), yet no one contests that administering antihypertensive
medication is unethical merely because one of the side-effects is impotence
(admittedly a harm to most individuals).347 Thus, mere presence of a harm that is
possible or even inherent in a procedure cannot make the performance of the
procedure unethical. Only when harms outweigh benefits, should a physician refrain
from acting. A balancing of harms and benefits must ensue in order to determine
whether a physician can ethically participate in a certain course of action.
Before proceeding to an issue by issue consideration of psychiatric involvement
in the criminal justice system in light of the above principle, a differentiation
between clinical and non-clinical harms348 must be made. Clinical harms are the
physiologic consequences that result from the treatment,349 and are also known as
side-effects. A competent physician can make a judgment on an individual basis
whether the clinical benefits to a given patient outweigh the clinical harm to that
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See Part V.A.2.
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Id.

346

See Part V.A.2.

347

See PHYSICIAN’S DESK REFERENCE 2284 (56th ed.) (2002).

348

See BLOCHE, supra note 126, at 316-19.

349

For example hair loss results from chemotherapy, and a loss of limb results from
amputation due to gangrene.
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patient.350 In order to assess the different clinical harms and benefits, the physician
can call on his training and education qua physician. It is within his area of expertise
to evaluate whether a particular treatment will cause more physiologic damage than
physiologic benefit and vice versa. It is because of that skill that a physician’s
assistance is sought in cases of illness. Therefore, in a situation where only
considerations are of a clinical (physiological) nature, a physician, regardless of
where and by who employed, can make a routine assessment of whether the benefits
outweigh the harms, making it ethical to embark upon the course of treatment
(subject to restrictions in Part V.A.2).
In the world of forensic psychiatry, however, there are also harms that can come
about that are not physiologic, but that can be attributed to the physician’s work.
These extra-clinical harms, on the other hand, are much harder to quantify and
calibrate with respect to any individual patient. What’s more, it may be hard to even
agree on what constitutes an extra-clinical harm. Even if it was possible to agree on
what constitutes such extra-clinical harm, it is not readily apparent that physicians
have any particular training or expertise to weigh these harms. Given these twin
problems of identification and valuation of extra-clinical harms, it is much more
difficult to arrive at a straight-forward formula for ethical behavior on the part of a
physician. Nonetheless, extra-clinical harms must be taken into account and
balanced against benefits prior to choosing a course of action; and the benefits of the
action chosen must outweigh the harms. Although it is indeed difficult to define and
valuate these harms, in the context of forensic psychiatry some extra-clinical harms
are quite apparent.
It must also be emphasized, that given the fact that the accused (or the
condemned or the NGRI acquitee) is a patient of the forensic psychiatrist,351 it is his
interests that psychiatrist should take into account, and not those of the society at
large. The patient’s interests take primacy over whatever benefits society would
derive from a different course of action. Because this is the standard that applies to
the practice of medicine in the “free world” (i.e., in the world outside of criminal
justice system), it should apply with equal force to the practice of medicine in
another setting. With this in mind, the extra-clinical harms to the patient can now be
identified.
Three main extra-clinical harms that stem from the interlacing of psychiatry and
criminal justice system can be readily identified. First, and perhaps most obvious is
the criminal incarceration of the individual. This qualifies as harm simply on the
basis that incarceration is a punishment;352 something unpleasant that one endures as
a consequence of bad actions.
Second, the institutionalization at a mental hospital is also an extra-clinical harm.
This is so for two reasons. Institutionalization restricts the freedom of the individual;
it also gives rise to negative societal attitudes towards patients.353 Stigma may also

350
As suggested below, the mere fact that clinical benefits outweigh the clinical harms is
not a blanket license to act in the face of the patient’s disagreement with that assessment.
351

See Rothstein, supra note 338 and accompanying text.

352

Here incarceration is limited strictly to criminal confinement.

353

See, e.g., Maria A. Morrison, Changing Perceptions of Mental Illness and the
Emergence of Expansive Mental Health Parity Legislation, 45 S.D. L. REV. 8, 8-9 (2000).
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arise from a finding of insanity which does not trigger confinement in a mental
institution. These harms are balanced against the benefits of medical help that one
receives at the hospital and the benefits of not being incarcerated in prison as a result
of the insanity finding. It is hard if not impossible to determine when these benefits
outweigh the harms or vice versa, and thus a psychiatrist enters a very murky world
indeed when his chosen course of action results in either of the outcomes.
The third harm that can arise from the involvement of psychiatrists in the penal
process is the execution of the convicted individual. Unlike the incarceration, the
execution is permanent, and unlike institutionalization, execution is not balanced by
any benefits to the individual. (There may well be a societal benefit to executions,
but that topic is best left for another article. Whatever benefit accrues to the society
as a result of execution or other penal measures, is nonetheless irrelevant, for as
discussed above, in a patient-physician interaction, the physician should be
concerned about patient’s harms and benefits not anyone else’s.) Regardless, a
physician does not act ethically when he uses his knowledge for purposes that are
antithetical to healing, and nothing is more antithetical to healing then causing a
death of an otherwise healthy human being.354
One can summarize the principle of “no harm” thus: a physician has to use his
medical knowledge to determine whether or not clinical benefits outweigh clinical
harms, and proceed only if they do. Physician must leave the weighing of nonclinical harms to the patient. In other words, no harm can be phrased as “no clinical
harm.”
2. The “Consent” Principle
As discussed above, the “no harm” principle has certain limitations, namely, the
difficulty in identifying and valuating extra-clinical harm especially when balanced
by a clinical benefit. Furthermore, “no harm” is not the end of the inquiry, as the
sterilization example has shown. Thus, an additional step is needed to satisfy oneself
that the action taken is indeed in the patient’s interest.
The basic principle that ought to govern any medical intervention is that of
personal autonomy. Personal autonomy is important for several reasons. First, it is
consistent with the Kantian prohibition against using a person as a means. If a
person is treated as nothing more than a mannequin that can be fine-tuned whenever
something goes awry, then the individual is being used simply as a means to achieve
a disease-free state. Therefore, a physician must take patient’s desires into account
before proceeding with any intervention. In this way, the person is being treated as
an end, because any intervention is done not with the goal of promoting general wellbeing without reference to a specific individual, but with the goal of providing the
patient with tools to achieve his own goals and live up to his own values.
Second, personal autonomy is important because of the difference in value
preferences between a doctor and the patient.355 It cannot be assumed that health and

354
This does not necessarily imply that it is unethical for a physician to cause a death of an
ill individual, as in for example assisted suicide. Irrespective of how one chooses to think
about the issue of assisted suicide, it has to be conceded that causing a death of a healthy
individual through the use of medical knowledge is ethically unacceptable.
355

See generally Alan H. Goldman, The Refutation of Medical Paternalism, THE MORAL
FOUNDATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS.
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prolonged life are the top values for every individual.356 Jehova’s Witnesses provide
an excellent example. Although blood transfusion may save the life of a given
individual, it will be refused by a Jehova’s Witness, because fidelity to religious
tenets is a higher order value for that individual than health or life. For a physician it
may be natural to elevate health to the top of the value rankings, as physician’s life is
dedicated to the preservation of health,357 but for the patient, the rankings may be
completely different. Thus, in order to keep the patient’s value system intact, a
physician should not act contrary to the patient’s wishes.358
The patient himself must evaluate (after being provided with complete and
truthful information) whether the benefits that any treatment will provide outweigh
the harms inherent in such treatment.359 Given the fact that medications used to treat
mental illness often have significant harmful side-effects,360 not to mention adverse
extra-clinical consequences that arise out of being a confirmed mental patient, the
individual should be allowed to judge for himself whether or not these negatives
outweigh the positives of being under treatment.
“Value-preference” consent theory is also useful in resolving the problem of
extra-clinical harm. As Part V.A.1 asserts, a physician has no expertise to perceive
and quantify the extra-clinical harm that comes from interaction with the penal
system versus, for example, the harm that comes from stigma of insanity label. To
be sure, a physician can most certainly express his preference if he himself were in a
similar situation, but that preference cannot substitute for the preference of the
patient. Again then, consent is quite useful in resolving the dilemma of extra-clinical
harm.
The above of course assumes a patient who is able to make decisions and give or
withhold consent for procedures. A child, a person who lacks capacity to understand
(e.g., someone with a low IQ score)361 and a person who is so mentally ill as to not be
able to process reality, are unable to weigh harms and benefits, and thus cannot
consent to the procedure.362 On the other hand, simply because consent cannot be
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Id.
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Id.
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It does not follow that the physician always must act in accordance with patient’s
wishes, though. A patient may desire an intervention that does not satisfy the “no harm”
analysis. In other words, a physician is not required to perform a procedure simply because
the patient so desires, but is required to abstain from performing it if the patient refuses it.
359

See AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION POLICY COMPENDIUM, Informed Consent,
(Opinion of Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, E-8.08, 1981).
360

Certain antipsychotics can cause tardive dyskenesia, a permanent movement disorder.
PHYSICIAN’S DESK REFERENCE 2535 (56th ed.) (2002).
361
Of course, neither a child, nor a person with such a low IQ score as to be considered
incompetent, will most likely be tried. Nor can these individuals be medicated into
competence, so treatment questions arise only in the context of civil commitment.
362

The word “reasonably” is purposefully omitted. Just because a person makes a decision
that given all the information available is “unreasonable” (e.g., refusing a blood transfusion
when such transfusion is medically necessary) does not automatically mean that a person
could not understand the information. Only a person who cannot understand the information
should be deemed unable to give or withhold consent; not merely a person who makes
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obtained, it does not follow that no treatment should be provided. When a person
cannot consent, a judgment must be made based on twin concepts of “best interest of
the patient”363 and patient’s own values, if known.364 When the physician is unaware
of the patient’s wishes, it has to be presumed that the patient would wish to be
treated if such treatment comports with the “no harm” standard.
There is a caveat that must not go unaddressed. Whenever not treating an
individual threatens harm to the society at large, the individual’s rights deserve less
deference than in a situation where society’s interests365 are not so threatened.366
Thus, a person afflicted with tuberculosis has a right to be untreated on the condition
that he is isolated from the rest of society. Similarly, a mentally ill patient who may
be dangerous to himself or others, in principle retains his right to remain free of
treatment if an alternative method of preventing harm to himself or society exists.
However, if no alternative is present, a person must be treated to the point where the
threat to himself or society is eliminated. However, once that point is reached, or an
alternative is found, even if the person is not completely “cured,” he regains his
unqualified right to choose the scope and the amount of treatment for himself.
3. The “Professionalism” Principle
When one thinks of the Hippocratic Oath, one traditionally thinks of its
proscription on causing harm.367 However, the Oath also demands that a physician
be loyal to his profession and that he keep his art pure.368 Thus, whenever practicing
medicine, a physician owes not only certain duties to his patient, but also a duty to
his profession. Of course part of this “professional duty” is the requirement that the
physician act in the best interest of the patient (according to the principles outline
decisions different from those that a “reasonable man” would make under similar
circumstances.
363
When a patient’s values/wishes are known, these wishes must be considered to be in the
patient’s “best interests” when the patient’s values/wishes are not known, the choice that
another person (possibly the physician himself, if there are no relatives or others close to the
patient to consult with) would make in a similar situation for himself become what would be
in the patient’s “best interests.” It is of course preferable that the physician try to elucidate
whenever possible the wishes and values of the patient in question, instead of making a
decision on his own.
364

See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976) (holding that when a person cannot give
consent a substitute judgment that takes account of the best interests of the patient must be
used); see also In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985) (holding that patient’s own wishes if
expressed while competent should predominate when making substituted judgment).
365

This determination is not to be made by a physician, but by appropriate regulatory
agencies. These agencies can institute reporting requirements for infectious disease, and then
deal with the situation if the individual refuses treatment.
366

Saying that individual’s rights are diminished does not mean, ipso facto, that he must
undergo treatment. Rather, it is an observation that when an individual presents a threat to
society, he is faced with a choice of being treated or being put in such situation where he
cannot threaten others. The choice nonetheless is his.
367

See supra text accompanying note 339.

368

STEADMAN’S MED. DICTIONARY 799 (26th ed.) (1995) (text of Hippocratic Oath, “I will
preserve the purity of my life and my art.”).
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above), but that is not the whole of physician’s responsibilities. He is also
responsible for making sure that his actions, even if consonant with principles of “no
harm” and “consent” are not harmful to the profession of medicine as a whole. That
is not to say that in order to benefit the art and science of medicine one may harm a
patient, but merely to say that prior to engaging in any action, a physician must
consider both the effect on a given patient and the effect on the profession of
medicine.
An objection to this principle can be raised along the lines that following the
dictate of “professionalism” is no different from balancing harms to the patient
against the harms to the society, an approach already rejected in this article.369 Yet,
this criticism is unwarranted. Unlike balancing patient’s harms and benefits against
that of the society, this principle does not call for the diminishing of the patient’s
central role in the risk-benefit analysis. Instead, this principle comes into play only
when the “no harm” and “consent” principles have been satisfied.
Thus, a physician must first satisfy himself that no harm will come to the patient.
If he cannot do so, the other two tests become irrelevant, for he should not take any
action. If he can so satisfy himself, he must then proceed to elicit the patient’s
consent for the proposed action (subject to limitations outlined in Part V.A.2).
Again, if the consent is denied, the physician must stop. If the consent is granted, the
physician can proceed, but only insofar as the proposed actions will not reflect
poorly on his profession.
As Part III mentions,370 not all actions currently taken by psychiatrists are rooted
in hard science. Aside from such questionable techniques as offering opinions based
on nothing more than hypothetical questions propounded by counsel for either
side,371 psychiatrists also engage in actions for which they are simply not trained.
Among them are predictions of future dangerousness,372 and testifying on “test
questions,” which are nothing more than legal and moral conclusions.373 Not being
experts on the field, yet offering opinions on the matter, psychiatrists diminish their
profession and bring it into disrepute. Because moral outlook (and thus testimony on
issues of morality) by definition cannot be grounded in science, psychiatrist who do
so testify practically invite opposing testimony. The “battle of the experts” that
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See Part V.A.1.
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See supra, accompanying notes 131-34; see also HAGEN, supra note 139.
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LAFAVE, supra, note 8, at 378; see also supra text accompanying note 133.
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The American Psychiatric Association, for example, condemned this practice, stating
that “[t]he ability of psychiatrists or any other professionals to reliably predict future violence
is unproved.” AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, CLINICAL ASPECTS OF THE VIOLENT
INDIVIDUAL 30 (1974). Studies have shown that psychiatrists are right in their predictions
roughly 1/3 of the time, an abysmal record by any standards (after all, pure guessing would
produce right answers roughly 50% of the time). The false positive rate was even higher,
80%. See JOHN MONAHAN, PREDICTING VIOLENT BEHAVIOR: AN ASSESSMENT OF CLINICAL
TECHNIQUES 64-67 (1981). Despite these studies, psychiatrists continue to give and courts
continue to use such testimony. See Mark David Albertson, Can Violence Be Predicted?
Future Dangerousness: The Testimony of Experts in Capital Cases, 3-WTR CRIM. JUST. 18, 19
(1989).
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results often causes juries to discount psychiatric testimony altogether,374 and
diminishes the respect that the public holds for the profession.
B. Application of Principles
Bearing the above principles in mind one can review the participation of
psychiatrists in the criminal justice system at points outlined in Part III, supra, a
propos of these rules.
1. Competency to Stand Trial or for Execution
In evaluating the defendant prior to the beginning of trial so as to verify his
mental state, the psychiatrists serves an essential medical function, one practiced by
physicians the world over, namely assessing the patient. It is irrelevant who employs
the physician, because as stated before, a physician “acting in a capacity that requires
a psychiatrist's education, judgment, and experience is, in that role, practicing
psychiatry,”375 and thus owes the primary duty of allegiance to the patient and not the
employer. The potential conflict arises not in the actual evaluation,376 but in
submitting a report to the court detailing the findings. If the report is adverse to the
defendant, an extra-clinical harm ensues, i.e., the defendant is brought to trial with
the potential for conviction and incarceration.377 On the other hand, if the report is
favorable to the defendant, an extra-clinical harm ensues from the likely committal to
a psychiatric institution with the attendant potential clinical harms from any
medication that may be administered. Of course, with a favorable report, the
defendant also enjoys the benefits (though perhaps temporary) of escaping criminal
responsibility and/or punishment. At the very least, when the report is favorable to
the defendant, harms are counter-balanced (though not necessarily outweighed) by
the benefits. When the report is not favorable however, no such balancing occurs,
and thus a psychiatrist causes more harm than good and becomes directly responsible
for such harm.
Because a psychiatrist does not know a priori which way the competency report
is going to come out, he runs the risk of placing himself in a situation where he
would behave in an unethical manner. However, it cannot be that a psychiatrist can
only be allowed to submit his report when such a report is beneficial to the patient.
Another solution to this dilemma must exist. This solution must also close the door
to the tendency of the courts to use psychiatric testimony at the competency stage as
a justification to deal with the defendant in a way that they would have done anyway.
Psychiatrists should not give in to the temptation to justify the decision of the courts,
and should confine themselves to the proper medical function, i.e., evaluating a
374

See Sundby, supra, note 82; see also State v. Evans, 523 A.2d 1306 (Conn. 1987);
Montano v. State, 468 N.E.2d 1042 (Ind. 1984); Ice v. Commonwealth, 667 S.W.2d 671 (Ky.
1984); Commonwealth v. Tyson, 402 A.2d 995 (Pa. 1979); see also supra text accompanying
note 187.
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Rothstein, supra, note 338.
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One assumes that during the evaluation a psychiatrist is acting professionally, and that
he is practicing good psychiatry.
377
Although this section speaks in terms of competency to stand trial, everything said
applies with equal if not greater force to the situation where competency to be executed is at
issue.
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patient and providing medical information elicited from such evaluations for the
court. Of course, a psychiatrist still cannot know a priori what medical information
he will elicit from the patient exam, nor the way in which the court will treat the
information. However, a psychiatrist can safely say that there are no identifiable
harms that come from the examination itself, thus satisfying the first condition of
ethical behavior.378 Second, a psychiatrist has the patient’s consent for evaluation (or
consent of someone standing in the stead of a presumably incompetent individual).
However, that consent can only extend to the area within the psychiatrist’s expertise.
A psychiatrist can no more be presumed to have patient’s consent to render legal
opinions (and “competency” is a legal not medical matter), than he can be presumed
to have patient’s consent to invest in a stock market.
By solely engaging in a diagnostic procedure without drawing any legal
conclusions therefrom, a psychiatrist escapes causing harm to the patient, and does
not act beyond the scope of the consent. Whatever harm does result becomes
attenuated by having been interpreted by and processed through the legal machinery.
One might ask how this solution is different from what occurs today. After all, a
psychiatrist’s report as to competency is not final; the final decision still remains
with the court even under today’s rules. The difference lies in the fact that today’s
rules allow the psychiatrist to pass on questions concerning the ultimate question,379
i.e., is the defendant’s mental health such that he cannot understand the charges
against him or effectively assist in his own defense. Although the courts do have to
pass the final judgment on the matter, they most often defer to the “expert”
testimony.380 The court-appointed psychiatrist for all intents and purposes becomes
the final judge in determining whether the defendant will enter the criminal justice
system,381 and in that role he may end up behaving unethically in those cases where
his determination causes harm without corresponding benefit to the patient. Being a
“final judge” is medically unethical because it causes an identifiable harm to the
patient, that is not balanced by any particular benefit, and because the psychiatrist is
acting beyond his expertise and therefore, beyond the scope of consent.
Even assuming that the psychiatrist does have the patient’s explicit consent to
speak on moral issues, he should not do so, because it violates the “professionalism”
principle. By testifying on issues of morality (presumably at patient’s request), the
psychiatrist invites opposing testimony from psychiatrist with different moral
precepts. There will then be testimony cloaked in the legitimacy of the white coat,
yet having nothing to do with either art or the science of medicine. Of course, lay
populace may still feel resentful towards psychiatrists for “getting the defendant off,”
much in the same way that the feel resentment for attorneys who defend unpopular
clients or causes. However, so long as psychiatrists do not stray from practicing
378
Because no harm come from the evaluation itself, a psychiatrist is not obligated to
completely withdraw from the process. As any other physician, he can observe the patient,
and share his observations with others (within the legal limits of the patient’s right to
confidentiality).
379

See supra notes 175-188 and accompanying text.
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The expert testifying for the defendant is usually given more credence by the court than
the prosecution expert. See LAFAVE, supra note 8, at 372; Weihofen, supra note 13, at 96768.
381

Id.
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medicine, i.e., from diagnosing and describing the diagnosis, such resentment will be
minimal. In any case, whatever resentment there may be, it is inconsequential, for
the science of medicine cannot be brought into disrepute simply because the legal
profession chooses to use certain medical diagnosis as an exculpatory or mitigating
factors.
The proposed solution would allow a psychiatrist to do nothing more than to
document an illness from which the defendant may be suffering. In his report the
psychiatrist would be allowed to list defendant’s symptoms and diagnosis, as well as
common patterns of behavior or problems exhibited by people with this diagnosis.
He would also be allowed to state whether a given defendant encountered some, all
or none of these problems. In other words, in court, the psychiatrist would act no
differently than in a clinical setting where he would present the patient’s case to a
team of other psychiatrists. The court would then be presented with nothing more
than medical testimony and would have to make its own judgment as to what to do
with the defendant without using the “expert” testimony as a fig leaf. A psychiatrist,
on the other hand, is spared venturing into potentially unethical terrain.
2. Testimony at Trial
The problem at a competency hearing is that the court generally relies on the
court-appointed “independent” expert, and such expert does not know a priori
whether his actions will cause more harm or more good, nor can he even make a
good faith estimate on the issue, because he cannot properly valuate the harms.
(That is markedly different from a physician embarking on a course of treatment that
he is not sure will benefit his patient, for such physician at the very least has to have
a good faith belief that the actions he takes are for the patient’s overall physiologic
benefit.) This problem is not present at trial when the issue of sanity at the time of
the offense is litigated. The expert knows quite well what he is expected to testify to,
simply based on who has hired him, and thus is aware of the patient’s relative values
of harms and benefits.382 This of course is not to suggest that experts sell their
testimony for money; nonetheless, it is clear that if an expert hired by either side
does not confirm their theory, such expert will not be asked to testify.
Accordingly, the literal interpretation of the “no harm” principle would hold that
psychiatrists testifying for the defense act ethically (because no harm comes from
evaluation, and they act within the scope of the consent given, and consonant with
the patient’s value rankings when actually testifying), while those testifying for the
prosecution do not (because they do not act consonant with the patient’s valuerankings). This outcome cannot be right as a matter of policy calling for adversarial
judicial process, where either side can use its experts to rebut the findings of experts
for the other side. As a matter of ethics, however, it may very well be right. When a
psychiatrist ventures onto the field of morals (and as discussed previously, Part II,
supra, sanity is a matter of moral judgment)383 he cannot claim the balance required
in the legal system as a shield for his own actions; his actions must only be guided by
the ethics of medicine, and not by any desires of the legal system. For that reason,
382
If the psychiatrist is hired by the defense, he may assume that prison ranks lower than
an NGRI acquittal on the defendant’s value-preference scale. If the psychiatrist is hired by the
prosecution, he too is aware of the same value-scale, yet acts contrary to it.
383

See supra notes 16-17 and the accompanying text.
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when a psychiatrist chooses to testify for the prosecution, i.e., when he knowingly
assists the state in its attempt to exercise its punitive power, he acts contrary to
medical ethics.
It thus seems that good policy is in direct conflict with medical ethics so long as
the current system is in place. However, by taking the approach enunciated in Part
V.B.1, supra, i.e., limiting psychiatric testimony only to diagnosis and description of
a recognized illness, the ethical quandary is avoided.384
Diagnosis is a
quintessentially medical function. Furthermore, medical diagnosis is grounded in
science that can be agreed to by psychiatrists working for either the defense or the
prosecution, while criminal responsibility is grounded in morals, and therefore
susceptible to much broader disagreements. By simply adducing defendant’s
diagnosis (if any) into evidence, the psychiatrist does not directly help the state
exercise its penal functions, for any decision as to how to interpret or how much
weight to give to the defendant’s diagnosis vis-à-vis his moral culpability remains
the sole province of the court and the jury. By not drawing moral conclusions or
answering “test questions,” psychiatrists keep themselves away from the ethical
morass of helping the state incarcerate or execute someone.
3. Actions of “Independent Panels”
This article has dedicated significant time and space to the discussion of an
“independent panel” system of psychiatric involvement in the adjudicatory process.
That discussion was to lay the groundwork for the argument that the ethical problems
encountered by psychiatrists in the criminal justice system are not dependent on the
adversarial system or the “battle of the experts;”385 rather they result from the close
involvement of psychiatrist in the criminal justice system. The Soviet system
provided for an independent panel of experts to evaluate a defendant and pronounce
his fitness to stand trial or his fitness to be held liable for his actions. Even though
the psychiatrists technically were not there to help the state incarcerate individuals,
given the fact that their decisions were rarely questioned, they exercised inordinate
authority over the lives of human beings. The presence of that excess authority led
to the numerous abuses of psychiatry.
Some may argue that it was the repressive Communist state that caused
psychiatric abuses and not the vesting of power in the medical profession, but that
argument is fallacious. The case of Colonel Budanov arose well after the collapse of
384
Alternatively, it can be argued that while the psychiatrist for the prosecution cannot
testify on moral issues under the “no harm” principle, the psychiatrist for the defense cannot
testify on these issues under the “professionalism” principle. (Of course, the prosecution’s
psychiatrist is also constrained by the “professionalism” principle, but there is no need to
reach it as the “no harm” principle comes first).
385

There is a separate problem with the “battle of the experts,” namely that such spectacles
demean medicine as a profession because they suggest that there is no objective truth or
criteria in the field of psychiatry. A corollary of the above problem is disillusioned juries
ignoring psychiatric testimony altogether, thus defeating the very purpose behind “expert
witnesses.” See Part III, supra. Thus, “battles of the experts,” especially on issues that are not
grounded in medical science are to be avoided on the “professionalism” principle. They may
be avoided by using independent panels, but it is by no means the only way, and certainly not
an acceptable one, if not coupled with the limitations on testimony previously discussed in this
article.
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the USSR, yet psychiatrists in that case were afforded significant opportunity to have
the surrounding events and the political situation in the country influence their
judgment. Granted, today’s Russia is still far from the democratic ideals espoused
by the United States; nonetheless, even in the United States, if given a completely
free hand psychiatrists are likely to have their world outlook, current events and
political persuasions color their judgment. It is at this point, when a psychiatrist
overlays his own values onto a diagnosis, he perverts the medical nature of his
involvement into a political and/or penological tool. Such behavior is contrary to
medical ethics, specifically, the principles of “no harm” and “professionalism,” and
should be guarded against. The solution to this problem is the one already discussed
in the previous two subsections. With this solution adopted, a psychiatrist can only
diagnose disease and his ability to impose his own values on that diagnosis is
extremely limited. The problem of the Soviet-type system is solved not with crossexamination (although that too is highly useful and valuable) but limiting the range
of testimony that psychiatrists can offer, thus shielding them from potentially
unethical practices.
4. Medicating the Prisoners
Psychiatrists often have to medicate prisoners in order to maintain their mental
health. The majority of such treatment is done with the defendant’s consent and with
no other purpose than to alleviate pain. These instances are fully consonant with the
consent principle. However, as discussed is Part III, supra, there are instances when
an incompetent person is medicated with the eye to make him competent to stand
trial or be executed. The ethicist encounters two problems in this situation. One, if a
person is incompetent and/or insane, and medicating him will restore his competence
and/or sanity, a cognizable clinical benefit has been achieved, yet this benefit is
balanced by an extra-clinical harm. The harm can be starkly defined, as in
execution, or more amorphous, as in standing trial which may or may not result in
punishment of varying severity. Second, because the person is incompetent, he
cannot grant or withhold consent.386 Nor is relying on “the best interest of the
patient” likely to provide any helpful guidance, for in order to define “best interests,”
one would need to balance harms and benefits, thus running into the problem of
valuation and balancing already described.387 Faced with this predicament, a
psychiatrist could simply decide to do what the legal system dictates, but such action
would assume that what is legal is necessarily moral, hardly a self-evident
proposition.
A middle ground is then perhaps the best and the only solution. A psychiatrist
cannot allow himself to be the direct cause of death (or for that matter other punitive
measures visited upon the prisoner). Thus, medicating someone solely for the
purpose of restoring competence (be it for execution, trial, etc.) is wholly improper
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An individual incompetent to stand trial may be competent to refuse medication, but in
that case the dilemma is easier because consent can be given or withheld. The issue here is
what to do with those incompetent to stand trial (be executed) and give consent to medical
treatment.
387

See Part V.A.2.
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on the grounds of the “no harm” principle.388 It also violates the “consent” principle,
as admittedly the purpose of medication is not to follow the patient’s wishes, but
simply to restore a legal status of competence. Yet, a psychiatrist cannot refuse to
medicate a person on death row if a person wants to continue medication simply
because such actions will keep that person competent and thus liable to be executed.
This is so because a psychiatrist has to maintain his responsibility to the condemned
as a patient, despite the fact that this patient is scheduled for execution. A
physician’s responsibility has to be uniform regardless of the patient’s status in the
criminal justice system. This responsibility is not a sliding scale where duty is
inversely proportional to the level of restriction society has imposed on individual’s
freedom. Thus, the mere prospect of execution does not make psychiatric help
unethical, any more than the fact of incarceration makes such help unethical. The
dilemma must be resolved by resorting to patient’s (prisoner’s) own wishes. So long
as the patient is informed of the consequences of his decisions, whether they result in
the death penalty being applied, or in the prisoner languishing in a state of perpetual
incompetence, or in any other outcome, the patient’s wishes should be honored. In
so doing, a psychiatrist acts within the canon of medical ethics.
The problem however, is that an incompetent inmate cannot consent to treatment.
On the other hand, medicating such an individual cannot be said to be against his
will, as the person does not have free will as a result of his own incompetence.389
Since medicating such an individual is likely to bring clinical relief without causing
immediate death, it is then ethical for a psychiatrist to medicate such individual to
competence. With restoration to competence, free will returns, and at that point, the
prisoner may refuse further medication by exercising his free will and refusing to
give his consent for further medication.
Operating under the principle of consent, a psychiatrist should then cease
medicating the individual. Of course, once medication ceases, the prisoner is likely
to revert back to the pre-medication condition, and it would be rather futile to have
this process repeat ad infinitum. Fortuitously, no need for such repetition exists, for
once the prisoner reverts back to incompetence, the psychiatrist must be guided by
the principle of respecting patient’s wishes previously expressed.
By acting according to the above scheme a psychiatrist maintains his duty to treat
the ill, yet avoids being the instrument of death or other penal interests of the state.
If the prisoner, after being restored to competence, judges that the harms of further
treatment outweigh the benefits, he is free to cease treatment and thus bring to a halt
all legal proceedings that the state has pending against him.
The main objection to this proposal will be the perception that some criminals
will manipulate the system in such a way as to escape punishment. This article will
not quarrel with this notion, but will provide an answer to the charge. Society has
388
AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION POLICY COMPENDIUM, Capital Punishment (Opinion
of Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, E-2.06, 1980, updated 1992, 1994, 1995, 1998,
1999, 2000).
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Of course the doctor is not the one who should be making the decision, but rather a
guardian for that patient. The guardian often is the state, whose interests may be contrary to
the patient’s (e.g., execution). A physician nonetheless can medicate such a patient provided
that death is not an immediate result of such medication. A physician may medicate the
patient only to a point where the patient can decide for himself whether or not to continue with
the treatment.
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settled on the belief that the insane and incompetent are not fit for punishment. So
long as this moral idea persists, society must live with the result that some people
whom it would otherwise like to punish will be able to escape condemnation. Much
like the society is willing to tolerate criminals taking refuge in the Fourth or Fifth
Amendment to escape punishment no matter how strong the evidence of guilt is, so
too must society accept the notion that so long as reprieve from punishment is
available to the insane, some people would take refuge in it, even if they could be
medicated out of their condition.
5. Treating the Acquitted
The same approach that was suggested towards prisoners should be taken
towards the acquitted, for after all, those committed to psychiatric institutions differ
from prisoners in name only. If the individual refuses treatment and constitutes a
danger to himself or others, he can of course remain confined, and if he continues to
constitute a threat even when confined, the exception to the consent principle can be
invoked.390 It is worth noting that even if the exception to the consent principle is
invoked, one must recognize that the benefits (both clinical and extra-clinical) from
such involuntary medication are quite tangible, while the harms are not; after all the
patient no longer faces the threat of punishment within the criminal justice system, as
he has already been acquitted.
The only additional point worth making is that psychiatrists must not let the
judiciary dictate the methods of treatment to them. In Part III, supra, it has been
mentioned that courts often ignore psychiatric recommendations as to patients who
have been deemed worthy (in the clinical sense) of release from
institutionalization.391 While psychiatrists are powerless to challenge confinement
orders, they cannot continue to carry out treatments that are no longer in the patient’s
interest. Such behavior would violate the “no harm” principle.392 Thus,
psychiatrists, if they wish to be involved in treating the NGRI acquittees, must treat
them no different from other patients irrespective of the judicial views on this class
of patients. In other words, judicial orders and power (e.g., deciding on commitment
and release) cannot be used as a shield for psychiatrists engaging in an otherwise
unethical behavior, i.e., acting contrary to the patient’s interests.
6. Competency for Execution
A brief note must be made about psychiatric participation in execution. This
article outlined the parameters of proper psychiatric involvement in trial competency
evaluations in Part V.B.1. The argument here is that nothing changes when the
hearing is to determine competency for execution as opposed to for trial. Although

390
See Part V.A.2 (stating that in situations where an individual is dangerous to society,
and no other method to control dangerousness exists, a patient can be mediated without his
consent.) This is however, a rare and extreme case.
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See supra notes 275-79 and the accompanying text.
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The behavior also violates the “professionalism” principle, because whenever
psychiatrists act as merely a penological tool, they demean the profession. Although the
“professionalism” principle is violated, as discussed above, there is no need to reach it. See
supra, note 382.
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Professor Bloche argues that the death penalty is qualitatively different393 from any
other sort of punishment, it is argued here that the difference is only quantitative, and
therefore does not require any special ethical consideration by psychiatrist. Whether
a psychiatrist testifies in a setting of execution competency hearing, or presentencing hearing, or pre-trial competency hearing, legal consequences (of one sort
or another) flow from such testimony. These legal consequences may be harmful to
the individual about whose condition the testimony is being proffered. However, a
psychiatrist is not in a position to evaluate these harms because he has no specialized
training for doing so. Again, even if the patient consents to these harms, a
psychiatrist must guard against unprofessional behavior.
The key therefore is to put as much of a distance as possible between physician’s
testimony and legal consequences of whatever sort, and to require a psychiatrist to
act within the scope of the consent given him,394 and within the scope of his
professional expertise.395 This can be accomplished by the psychiatrist (regardless of
who employs him) being no more than a physician to a given patient. He can
therefore discuss the patient’s medical condition but may not draw legal conclusions
as to competency or “understanding.” In short, in this setting, psychiatrist’s duties to
his patient are neither increased nor diminished, and he must act consistent with the
principle of “no [medical] harm” and patient’s consent.
VI. CONCLUSION
Insanity and criminal justice have been linked for over 2,000 years, and the
involvement of psychiatrists in the criminal justice system both in this country and
abroad is here to stay. However, such involvement is fraught with ethical perils and
can push a medical professional beyond the realm of treatment and cure and into the
realm of punishment and execution. Such behavior is not consistent with the exalted
role that the healers hold in society and tarnishes their role and image. What began
as a noble attempt to have judges and juries render their verdicts on the basis of
scientific evidence has too often deteriorated into psychiatrists being active
participants in the state penal system. Such intertwining of two completely
incompatible systems cannot continue if the ethics of the medical profession are to
be maintained. In order to maintain the benefits of scientific information being
available to the courts while upholding the principles of medical ethics, psychiatrists
need to limit their involvement solely to scientifically verifiable information and act
in the same way towards inmates that they would towards any other patient. With
this approach there is yet a possibility that the high ethical standards demanded of
healers will remain intact.
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